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Preface 
 
For my master International Relations in Historical Perspective I did an internship at the 
ICTY between March and June 2007. Working in a team of six attorneys in the office 
immediately next to the Registrar, I learned a great deal about the ICTY. It was a great 
experience. When I started to read more about the ICTY, I realised that relatively little has 
been written about the Outreach efforts of the Tribunal. During my internship, the topic of my 
thesis materialised. Little progress was made on my thesis once I obtained a position at the 
ICTY. 
I worked at the Tribunal between June 2007 and February 2008. During this time I 
came to understand much more about the internal workings of the United Nations and how 
courts internally function. At the end of 2008 I again worked for four months at the ICTY. In 
the interval, I went on an extended visit to the region. 
I would like to thank Edmir Veljovic especially for helping me to explore the countries 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and of course Serbia (in particular Belgrade and 
Zemun). I never have been welcomed so warmly. His friends treated me as their friends and 
his family treated me as family. They made my visit to the region unforgettable. Although the 
exploration of the region was instructive in itself, because of Edmir, Emir, Dino, Teta, Bećir, 
Asija, Besim and so many other this investigative trip became one of the best holidays I ever 
had! 
Also I want to thank my girlfriend Jaimee Campbell for assisting me with my English, 
reading the thesis over and over again and to put up with me when I was not to be put up with.  
 
 
8 July 2009,  
 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 
 
 
Erik Pronk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Introduction 
Since the very first hearing on 8 November 1994,1 the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) has indicted a total of 161 individuals. As of this writing, 117 
proceedings have been completed: 10 persons acquitted, 58 sentenced,2 and 13 have had their 
cases transferred to local courts. At present, proceedings are ongoing with regard to 45 
accused: ten are at the appeals stage, six are awaiting judgment, twenty are currently on trial 
and seven are at the pre-trial stage. Only two fugitives are still at large, Goran Hadžić and 
Ratko Mladić.3  
Since its inception in 1993, the ICTY has achieved a great deal.4 For the first time in 
history, rape and other gender offences have been recognized as war crimes.5 The ICTY has 
demonstrated that the Anglo-American common law and continental law can be unified. The 
ICTY has given a significant development to international criminal law. By publicizing the 
suffering of the victims, the international court has recognized the sufferings of the victims. It 
has judged war criminals at all hierarchical levels: the ICTY prosecutors even indicted a 
sitting head of a state for the first time in history. ICTY’s work and achievements have 
inspired the creation of other international criminal courts, including the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). With these achievements in mind, the ICTY appears very 
successful.  
However, the ICTY, in its sixteenth year of its existence and working on more cases 
than ever, is not being appreciated by the people of the region. In a recent Tanjug News 
agency poll, more than half of the Serbian population queried would be against extradition of 
Ratko Mladić if the former general were arrested, and four of every ten Serbs are against all 
                                                
1
 See referral request in the Tadić case, of 8 November 1994, at: http://www.icty.org/case/tadic/4, viewed 20 
June 2009, 12:30. 
2
 With 26 having served their sentences, and two persons having died while serving their sentences (due to 
natural causes). Another 36 cases have been terminated either because indictments were withdrawn or because 
the accused died before or after transfer to the Tribunal. See also ICTY Key Figures at 
http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures, viewed 20 June 2009, 13:00. 
3
 See ICTY press release of 4 June 2009, "President Robinson’s Address Before the Security Council", at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10148 and "Prosecutor Brammertz’s Address Before The Security Council", at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10147, viewed 20 June 2009, 12:30. 
4
 See for example the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, "ICTY Legacy", at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/29371.html, viewed 24 June 2009, 12:30. 
5
 See press release of 22 February 2001, "Judgement of trial chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic 
Case" which was the first ICTY convictions of rape as a crime against humanity and it was the first convictions 
of enslavement as a crime against humanity. See the press release at http://www.icty.org/sid/8018, viewed 20 
June 2009, 13:00. 
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forms of cooperation with what is often referred to as the “Haski Tribunal”.6 Among some 
national communities, in particular the Serbs and the Croats, it is fair to say the ICTY is 
widely despised. In Bosnian Muslim and Albanian communities, the work of the ICTY often 
brings a mixture of hope, gratitude, disappointment and disillusionment.7 
Now that the ICTY is in its completion phase – the cases are scheduled to finish in 
early 2012 and the appeals in 2013 - the achievements of the international tribunal are 
crystallizing.8 The ICTY was an example for the International Criminal Court and developed 
international humanitarian law considerably by putting theories into practice and creating 
laws and legal precedents where there were none. It is all the more striking then that the court 
is disliked and mistrusted by the people that really matter: the people of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
In 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established a 
section to reach out to the people in the region. But this unit was clearly not a priority of the 
management of the Tribunal: The section was created only in 1999 – the sixth year of the 
Tribunal’s existence – and was not included in the ICTY’s budget.  The section’s sole funding 
continues to come from contributions collected from outside donors. Results from this 
“Outreach” section were not apparent until March 2000, because the employees of the section 
had to organize resources before it could operate.9 To this day the Outreach section is 
responsible for organizing its own funding.   
In this thesis I will examine what the ICTY has done to address (and correct) 
misperceptions of its achievements throughout the former Yugoslavia. Such an investigation 
has received too little attention from scholars previously, while – I believe – the question is 
worth posing. After all, the Tribunal was established to serve the citizens of the former 
Yugoslavia. It appears that the ICTY has neglected its constituents. 
                                                
6
 See De Telegraaf of 28 jan 2009, "Steun voor Tribunaal in Servië brokkelt af", at 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/3105632/__Weinig_steun_Tribunaal_in_Servie__.html?p=3,1, viewed 29 
Januari 2009, 9:40. Despite of the $1.3 million reward offered for information on Mladić by the US, other 
queries confirm that the majority of the Serbian population would not provide any information. See for example 
Angus Reid Global Monitor of 3 February 2009, "Serbs Would Not Help with Mladic’s Arrest", at: 
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/32759/serbs_would_not_help_with_mladics_arrest, viewed 4 February 
2009, 9:15. 
7
 See also Dan Saxon, “Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY Among the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim 
Communities in the Former Yugoslavia”, 562 in the Journal of Human Rights, 4:559-572 (2005). 
8
 See press release of 4 June 2009, "President Robinson’s Address Before the Security Council", at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10148 and ICTY Completion Strategy Report of 18 May 2009, S/2009/252, 3 and 
“Bringing Justice to the former Yugoslavia: the Tribunal’s Core Achievements”, at: 
http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/achieve-e.htm, viewed 25 June 2009, 12:00. For the latest estimate 
when the ICTY will close down, see Balkan Insight of 8 July 2009: "UN Extends Mandates of ICTY Judges", at: 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/20923/, viewed 9 July 2009, 9:00. 
9
 See the ICTY website, "ICTY Outreach Activities - 2000", at: http://www.icty.org/sid/10109, viewed 20 June 
2009, 13:45. 
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The ICTY is the first international tribunal since the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946) 
and Tokyo Trials (1946-1948). In the time between the creation of the international tribunals 
concerning World War Two and the establishment of the ICTY, International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) developed significantly. Most articles and books concerning the Tribunal 
concentrate on the development of international law and the cases before the ICTY trial 
chambers. The works that deal with the ICTY usually focus on the Western public and 
Western politicians of the international community. Moreover, a large amount of the work 
concerning the ICTY has been written by former staff members of the Tribunal.  
Relatively little has been written about the outreach efforts of the ICTY. The few 
articles that have been written concerning the Tribunal’s outreach efforts are not recent.10 
Most of articles concerning ICTY’s Outreach efforts, such as “International War Crimes 
Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach” by Clark (2009) and "The ICTY’s Outreach 
Programme and the Challenges to its Success at Shaping Local Popular Perceptions of the 
Tribunal” by Victoria Enaut (2006), express a positive belief in the Outreach program. None 
of the authors of the articles surveyed have truly scrutinized the effectiveness of the Outreach 
program. Although I have used all the aforementioned material for this thesis, I have relied 
mainly on primary material such as ICTY annual reports to the General Assembly (1994-
2008), Completion Strategy assessments (2004-2009) and the press releases of the Tribunal.  
In this thesis, I first provide a brief overview of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 
The war – and the committed war crimes - were the reason for the creation of the ICTY. In 
chapter one, titled “The ICTY 1993-1999”, I describe the foundation and the initial 
difficulties the Tribunal experienced throughout the nineties of the twentieth century. The 
problems the ICTY experienced hampered the court’s efforts to become fully operational. 
Only at the end of 1999 did the ICTY launch its Outreach program.  
Chapter two, entitled “Criticism from the Balkans, 1993-1999”, concentrates on the 
peoples, the leaders and the states of the former Yugoslavia. In this chapter it becomes clear 
that the local leaders used all of their instruments and influence to oppose the ICTY. At the 
end of the nineties, the peoples of the former Yugoslavia knew little about the war crimes 
committed by members of their own ethnic group. At that point, the prosecuted war crimes 
were denied, the ICTY accused were perceived as national heroes, and the Tribunal was 
considered controversial.  
                                                
10
 Most of the works have been written while the Outreach program had to be launched (September 1999-2000).  
Other work was published by ICTY-Outreach. 
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Chapter three, entitled “The ICTY 1999-2009”, concentrates on the activities of the ICTY 
Outreach program. By launching the Outreach program, the ICTY tried to communicate its 
work and its achievements to the constituents in the region. This chapter describes the initial 
difficulties, the main activities and the deficiencies of the program. Chapter four, entitled “An 
assessment of Outreach” evaluates the outreach efforts of the program and the fact that, rather 
than increasing public opinion in the region, public perception of the ICTY has actually 
declined in the years since Outreach was created.   
 8 
The (impact of the) war in the former Yugoslavia 
 In the eighties of the twentieth century the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) was characterized by uncertainty. Two long-term problems had never been solved: 
the degree of (political) centralization of the Yugoslav state and the unstable nationality 
issue.11 In the communistic country many (religious and ethnic) disputes were solved by the 
local authorities through force. Several factors increased the uncertainty. The death of the 
charismatic political and army leader Josip Broz Tito on 4 May 1980 left the country behind 
in a power vacuum. While the communistic party had lost its popular leader, the economy of 
the country became stagnant: the unemployment rate in the eighties rose to almost 25 percent 
and the average real income decreased.12 The end of the Cold War intensified the existing 
uncertainty: between 1989 and 1991 communist dictatorial regimes transformed in an 
unprecedented rate into more democratic forms of government. Communist establishments in 
Poland, East-Germany and Czechoslovakia fell within several weeks and political 
circumstances changed drastically in the neighbouring countries Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Albania. Because of the ideological decline of Communism and of the growing social-
economic confusion throughout the country, ruling elites in Yugoslavia were in search of 
more and better legitimisation of their positions in power.13 Therefore Yugoslavia decided in 
1990 upon democratic parliamentary elections. 
The first politician who recognised opportunities in the problems of SFRY was the 
Serbian Slobodan Milošević. After declaring support for ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, Milošević 
rose quickly to power in Yugoslavian politics.14 When Milošević claimed that the rights of the 
Serbian minority in Kosovo were regularly violated it was the first time that a leader of the 
Yugoslav Communist Party declared support for one particular ethnic group. By calling for 
more rights for ethnic Serbs, Slobedan Milošević took advantage of the problematic political 
                                                
11
 Ton Zwaan and Bob De Graaff, “Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië 1985-2005. Nationalisme, staatsmacht 
en massamoord” (Amsterdam/Antwerpen 2005) 64-65. 
12
 Zwaan and De Graaff, “Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië”, 64. 
13
 Ibidem, 64-65. 
14
 The Serbian minority in the autonomous province Kosovo claimed to be oppressed by the majority of ethnic 
Albanians. In 1987, Milošević said in front of Yugoslavian camera’s to the Serbian minority: "You will not be 
beaten!". See The New York Times of 26 April 1987, "Protest Staged by Serbs In an Albanian Region", at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/26/world/protest-staged-by-serbs-in-an-albanian-
region.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/M/Minorities%20(US)&scp=1&sq=Protest%20Staged
%20by%20Serbs%20In%20an%20Albanian%20Region;%2026%20April%201987&st=cse, viewed 12 July 
2009, 18:00 and see also the BBC documentaries “Fall of Milosevic” and “The Death of Yugoslavia”. 
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status of Kosovo as an autonomous province. Milošević became the first nationalistic 
politician of Yugoslavia.15  
In 1988, Milošević was elected as president of the Yugoslavian republic Serbia.16 
Through populism, the Serbian leader strengthened his power over other provinces of 
Yugoslavia. The mass protests against communistic authorities of 1988-1989 led to the “anti-
bureaucratic revolution” where politicians close to Milošević obtained influential positions in 
power.17 Through the populist and nationalistic anti-bureaucratic revolution, the Serbian 
president gained more control and influence over the Yugoslavian provinces Vojvodina, 
Kosovo and Montenegro. 
The anti-bureaucratic revolution effectively meant that the Serbian president 
Milošević and his supporters controlled four out of the eight republics and autonomous 
provinces of the Yugoslav federation: only if the four other republics of the Yugoslavian 
federacy – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia – were united, could they 
stop Milošević’s nationalistic program. The overturned balance of power in the Yugoslavian 
federation provoked nationalistic and often xenophobic separatism within all republics of the 
federation. Separatists in all Yugoslavian republics often used the same propaganda methods 
as the Serbian leader had done.  
In 1990 democratic elections were in all Yugoslavian republics won by nationalistic, 
usually xenophobic, parties that desired separation from the Yugoslavian federation. After 
winning nearly two-thirds of the seats in the Croatian parliament, the Croatian nationalistic 
leader Franjo Tuñman was elected president.18 The Croatian nationalists restored flags and 
other symbols of the fascist Ustaša-regime which were notorious for fighting alongside the 
Nazis during World War II and killing thousands Serbs and other non-Croats.19 Once Tuñman 
gained power, ethnic Serbs were removed from their positions in the government (such as 
police, security authorities, media and factories). Simultaneously, Serbian propaganda warned 
of an imminent threat of genocide by the Croatian authorities. 
                                                
15
 In doing so, Milošević broke with the party and government policy, which had restricted nationalist expression 
in the SFRY since the time of its founding by Josip Broz Tito after the Second World War. Milošević called for 
political change to reduce the autonomy of Kosovo, protect minority Serb rights, and initiate a strong crackdown 
on separatism in Kosovo.  
16
 In 1988, Slobodan Milošević was re-elected as Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the 
League of Communists of Serbia.  
17
 The New York Times reported a “wave of Serbian nationalism”, causing concern throughout Yugoslavia and 
leading to the resignation of government officials and to the election others that allied with Milošević. 
18
 See BBC News of 11 December 1999, "Franjo Tudjman: Father of Croatia", at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/294990.stm, viewed 15 July 2009, 13:30. 
19
 Mark Thompson, “Forging War. The Media in Serbia, Croatia Bosnia and Hercegovina” (Luton, UK 1999) 
135-191. 
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In August 1990, the Serbian minority in the Croatian republic rebelled against the 
Croatian authorities and declared the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina). 
The Serbian ethnic minority living in Croatia intended to become part of a ”greater-Serbia”. 
The Serbian president Milošević supported the ethnic Serbs in Croatia by sending the Serb-
dominated Yugoslav army to “oversee” the skirmishes.20 With help of the Yugoslav Peoples 
Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, JNA) the Serbian minority conquered a third of the 
Croatian country and declared themselves independent.21 When the republics Croatia and 
Slovenia declared themselves independent from the Yugoslavian federation on 25 June 1991, 
the skirmishes escalated into a full-scale war.22 
On 15 January 1992, the European Community (EC) recognised Croatia as an 
independent country. President Tuñman and president Milošević signed a ceasefire between 
Croatia and Yugoslavia in January 1992. In February 1992 the UN Security Council 
established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in order to maintain the 
ceasefire.23 The Yugoslavian army officially retreated from Croatia, and the UN dispatched 
38.000 peacekeepers throughout the area. However, the army of the Yugoslav federation left 
soldiers, equipment and weapons behind for the rebellious Serbs of the Krajina area.24  
The lightly-armoured UN peacekeepers were not prepared for war. UPROFOR was 
limited in its mandate and its means. The mission was restrained because of a reluctant 
international community. The light armaments and the restricted rules of engagement made 
UNPROFOR merely an observer force. Meanwhile, the rebellious Serbs destroyed whole 
villages and cultural and religious monuments to erase the (history of the) existence of the 
Croatian inhabitants in the Krajina area.  
The warfare escalated after the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared itself 
independent from Yugoslavia in April 1992. The Croatian president Tuñman and his Serbian 
                                                
20
 See Judgment in the Case “Prosecutor v. Milan Babic”, Case No. IT-03-72-S, of 29 June 2004, at: 
http://www.un.org/icty/babic/trialc/judgement/index.htm, viewed 26 March 2009, 20:30.  
21
 On 12 May 1991 a referendum was held asking: "Are you in favour of the SAO Krajina joining the Republic 
of Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and others who wish to preserve Yugoslavia?". 
With 99.8% voting in favour, the referendum was approved and the Krajina assembly declared that "the territory 
of the SAO Krajina is a constitutive part of the unified state territory of the Republic of Serbia". See Prosecutor 
v. Milan Martić Judgement, 46, at: http://www.un.org/icty/martic/trialc/judgement/mar-tcjud070612e.pdf, 
viewed 14 July 2009, 13:00. 
22
 See the whole book of Zwaan and De Graaff, “Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië”. 
23
 Security Council Resolution 743 (1992). For background information on the mission profile and the mandate 
see “United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR”, at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprofor.htm, viewed 15 July 2009, 13:45. 
24
 See for example Zwaan and De Graaff, “Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië”, 163-165. See also CIJ ICTY 
Reports Archive, Day 118, "Spy Gives Insider View: Lazarevic says Croatian war directed from Belgrade", at: 
http://iwpr.net/?p=ict&s=c&o=332461&apc_state=hencictd-text............-=-ict-publish_date....-e:>=-1.10.2002-
publish_date....-e:<-1.11.2002, viewed 27 March 2009, 11:00. 
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counterpart, Milošević agreed to divide the republic between their countries. The Croatian 
army supported the Bosnian-Croats that fought for a state of their own within Bosnia-
Herzegovina while the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian army fought on the side of the 
Bosnian-Serbs. Soon, the Serbian desire for a “greater-Serbia” clashed with the Croatian 
desire for a “greater Croatia”. Before long, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina exceeded the 
previous war in Yugoslavia. The war led to the deaths of thousands, caused enormous refugee 
flows and brought huge material damage.25  
International media started to report the atrocities that happened throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 26 When the British news channel ITN showed images of skeletal men behind 
barbed wire, the broadcast was quickly compared with images of concentration camps of the 
Second World War.27 The media attention caused a wave of indignation throughout the world. 
Everywhere people argued that that the world could not watch for the second time a 
systematic and organized extermination. U.S. President George H.W. Bush spoke in July 
1992 about a possible "genocidal process" in the Balkans.28 
In August 1992, the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report entitled "War 
Crimes in Bosnia-Hertzegovina” which described extreme violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) against mainly citizens. The report described that the warfare had a 
policy which resulted in mass killings, disappearances of civilians, arbitrary detention and 
forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of civilians based on ethnicity or religion. As the 
violence was directed against civilians and since the violence was targeted along ethnic and 
                                                
25
 Zwaan and De Graaff, “Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië”, 154-203. 
26
 The American journalist Roy Gutman wrote for the weekly magazine Newsweek a series of influential articles 
about atrocities and violations of humanitarian law in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina for which he later won 
the Pulitzer Prize. These articles "Ethnic Cleansing", 3 July 1992, "Prisoners of Serbia's War", 19 July 1992,  
"Like Auschwitz", 21 July 1992, "Witness' Tale of Death and Torture", 2 August 1992, "The war against Muslim 
and Croat civilians", 3 August 1992, "Personal account of terror", 3 August 1992, "Mass Rape", 23 August 1992, 
"Unholy War", 2 September 1992, "Death Camp Lists", 8 November 1992 en "Terror trail", 20 November 1992 
were all published in Newsweek. These and other articles are bundled in Roy Gutman, “A Witness to Genocide. 
The 1993 Pulitzer Prize-Winning Dispatches on the ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of Bosnia”(New York 1993). 
27
 The images of ITN were controversial: see also the VPRO, Tegenlicht episode “De zaak Milosevic. 
Kanttekeningen bij het proces”, at: http://www.vpro.nl/programma/tegenlicht/afleveringen/14130404/, and 
“Concentratiekamp of opvangkamp. Wat was het kamp in Trnopolje precies?” and "De Zaak Milosevic. De 
Verdediging Aan Zet”, all viewed 10 April 2008. 
28
 The US president stated: “We know that there is horror in these concentration camps. I cannot confirm on hard 
evidence the – some of the charges that have been made. It is absolutely essential – whatever is going on there – 
that there be open inspection, and that humane treatment of the people in these concentration camps be 
guaranteed. But in all honesty, I can’t confirm to you of the claims that there is indeed genocidal process going 
on there.”. See Pierre Hazan, “Justice in a Time of War. The True Story Behind the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (2004) 12-13. 
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religious lines, the NGO suspected genocide.29 In its conclusion, the NGO recommended an 
international tribunal to investigate, judge and punish perpetrators of crimes.30  
In the London Conference of 26-27 August 1992 Yugoslav president Dobrica Ćosić, 
Serbian president Milošević, Bosnian-Serb leader Karadžić, Croatian president Tuñman, and 
the Bosniak president Izetbegović discussed ending the war. During this peace-conference, 
the German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel proposed the creation of an international tribunal.31 
After the Cold War, proposals to establish criminal courts were popular.32 Proposals to create 
an international court were preceded by a number of statements proclaiming the perpetrators 
of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other crimes were “individually 
responsible” and would be called to account.33 The proposal of Kinkel became part of the 
final decision of the conference in London.34 
On 23 September 1992, Kinkel submitted the idea of a tribunal before the UN General 
Assembly.35 In a letter of 24 November 1992 the British government, which held the 
presidency of the European Union, proposed “to draft a convention establishing an ad hoc 
tribunal to deal with war crimes and crimes against the humanity committed in the former 
Yugoslavia”. France, the United States (US) and various other UN Member States started to 
draft a statute for a tribunal to be established.36 An internal UN study, the so called 
‘Commission of Experts’, also proposed the establishment of an international tribunal.37 
                                                
29
 Human Rights Watch, Report of 1 August 1992, “War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina” (Volume I), 0839. 
30
 Hazan, Pierre, “Justice in a Time of War. The True Story Behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia” (2004) 14. 
31
 Hazan, “Justice in a time of War”, 18 
32
 In response of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the hostage taking of foreigners and atrocities committed in 
Kuwait were there proposals to create an international tribunal. Then Prime Minister of Great-Britain, Margaret 
Thatcher said in a television interview given on 1 September 1990: “If anything happened to those hostages then 
sooner or later when any hostilities were over we could do what we did at Nuremberg and prosecute the requisite 
people for their totally uncivilized and brutal behaviour. They cannot get out of these days by just saying: ‘well, 
we were under orders’. That was the message of Nuremberg.”. See ICTY, “The Path to The Hague”, 9. Then US 
president  George Bush also mentioned Nuremberg several times and acting president of the council of ministers 
of the European Communities, Jacques Poos requested the UN Secretary-General to bring the Iraqi leaders 
before an international court. See ICTY, “The Path to The Hague”, 9 
33
 See for example the statements of the president of the UN Security Council of 4 August 1992, S/24378 and the  
acting US Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger who named on 16 December 1992 amongst others Slobodan 
Milošević as war criminal. See Hazan, “Justice in a time of war”, 30-34. Elie Wiesel and Eagleburger proposed 
to bring all war criminals before an international court for the former Yugoslavia. See ICTY, “The Path to The 
Hague”, 13, 65-67, 89-91. 
34
 The text states: “The Co-Charmen have undertaken to carry forward a study of the creation of an international 
criminal court.” See ICTY, “The Path to The Hague”, 63. President Cassese would later call it the “turning 
point”, see ICTY, “The Path to The Hague”, 13. 
35
 Hazan, “Justice in a time of War”, 23 
36
 See Michael Scharf, “Balkan Justice. The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since 
Nuremberg” (Durham, North Carolina 1997) 51-74. 
37
 Resolutions 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992 and 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992.of the UN Security Council 
affirmed in the course of 1992 the principle of individual responsibility for crimes under international law. Amid 
accounts of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights in the 
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When the UN Security Council adopted on 22 February 1993 Resolution 808 it decided to 
establish an international tribunal. Under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Security Council announced that it: 
 
“Decides that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of the international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991”.38 
 
By then, the long and bloody war in the former Yugoslavia had intensified. While the 
war between the former Yugoslavian republics of Croatia and Serbia had already caused the 
death of many thousands of citizens and the displacement of millions of refugees, these 
figures were easily exceeded by the casualties and the refugees resulting from the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.39 To describe the specific type of warfare, journalists invented the 
euphemism “ethnic cleansing” – where members of an ethnic majority persecute a minority to 
achieve ethnic homogeneity. Houses and apartments of the ethnic adversary were 
systematically plundered or burnt down and civilians were rounded up, captured and detained. 
In the process of ethnic cleansing, many citizens were beaten or killed, and many others were 
subject to systematic torture and rape. Through ethnic cleansing more than 70 per cent of the 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been conquered by the Bosnian-Serbs when the Security 
council decided upon the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to address these atrocities. 
 
Ineffective Efforts on the Part of the Security Council 
Although the Security Council had created with this Resolution 827 (1993) an 
international court, most spectators were cynical. To end the war in Yugoslavia the UN 
Security Council had a history of passing many non-convincing resolutions.40 The resolutions 
of the Security Council had produced little result: most resolutions were constantly violated. 
Increasingly, the Security Council appeared to be inflated. The unenforced resolutions made 
the Security Council look like a reluctant and ineffective institution and made its resolutions 
                                                                                                                                                   
conflicts of the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council passed resolution 780 (1992) on 6 October 1992, 
establishing the Commission of Experts to provide conclusions on these accounts. This Commission of Experts’ 
provisional report of 9 February 1993 concluded that the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal to try 
the perpetrators of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia: “would be consistent with the direction of its work”. 
38
 UN Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/S-RES-
827_93.htm, viewed 20 June 2009, 15:45 
39
 Zwaan and De Graaff, “Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië”, 57-203. 
40
 See for example Hazan’s list of unenforced Security Council Resolution: Security Council Resolution 713, 
721, 743, 752, 776, 781, 798, 807, 836 and 837 in Hazan “Justice in a Time of War”, 22-23. Where Hazan for 
example, writes that: “Resolution 781 […] prohibits aerial surveillance of Bosnia, is violated five hundred times 
before subsequent resolution (816) authorizes flights of NATO aircraft to enforce compliance.” See Hazan, 
“Justice in a Time of War”, 23. 
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appear hardly more than symbolic. The history of unenforced resolutions made the creation of 
the international court also appear symbolic. 
The United Nations appeared even more reluctant and ineffective when it became 
clear that the U.S. would not invest large sums of money in the investigation of war crimes. 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, the leader of the commission that investigated war crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia, felt that the commission was hindered by the same institution that created it:  
 
"We had zero resources to lead an investigation into war crimes that the U.N. 
Security Council, the most powerful organ in the international community, had 
entrusted us."41  
 
Furthermore, the Security Council was notorious for issuing resolutions such as 
Resolution 713 (1991) concerning the arms embargo to all the republics of the former 
Yugoslavia.42 This Resolution was intended to stop the war, but the embargo had the effect of 
creating an unfair advantage for the Serbs. It had disastrous results for the Croats and 
especially for the weakly armed Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since almost all armaments 
and weapon factories of Yugoslavia were located in Serbia. Many skeptics perceived the 
establishment of a war crimes tribunal mostly as a public relations device of the western 
states. In the words of the French journalist Hazan:  
 
“On the Richter scale of cynicism in politics, the creation of the ICTY is quite 
remarkable: The court served as an alibi for nonintervention.”43 
 
While the war was raging, international diplomats were trying to negotiate to achieve 
peace. It was clear that there could be no justice without peace, but it was equally clear that 
there could be peace without justice. Many observers were cynical because the ethics of an 
international court would probably not agree with the “real” politics as applied by most states. 
Thus, did it appear not very likely that the (always divided) international community would or 
could grant the international court the assistance it needed to become an effective court. Since 
two permanent members of the Security Council, Great-Britain and France, both had several 
thousand peacekeepers in the region, it appeared very likely that these states would insist on 
peace first– even at the cost of justice. 
                                                
41
 Hazan, “Justice in a Time of War”, 27. 
42
 See UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/713 of 25 September 1991, at 
http://www.nato.int/Ifor/un/u910925a.htm, viewed 20 June 2009, 15:00. De VN-veiligehidsraad besloot tot een 
wapenembargo om het conflict niet verder te laten escaleren. Het wapenembargo tegen Joegoslavië staat op 
slechte voet met Artikel 51 van het Charter van de VN waarin staat dat een staat het recht heeft om zichzelf te 
verdedigen. Zie http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ 
43
 Hazan,“Justice in a Time of War”, 191 
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The establishment of the ICTY  
On 25 May 1993, the UN Security Council decided to formally establish an 
international tribunal.44 In the same resolution the Security Council decided that that all UN 
member states were obliged to “cooperate fully with the international tribunal”45 and that: 
  
“…all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law 
to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, 
including the obligation of States to comply with requests of assistance or 
orders issued by a Trial Chamber[…]” 
 
Thus, by adopting Resolution 827, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) became a reality on paper. Practical arrangements for the establishment 
of the international tribunal had to be arranged by then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali.46  
 
By 25 May 1993, the international community had tried to pressure the leaders of the 
former Yugoslavian republics diplomatically, militarily, politically, economically, and – with 
Resolution 827 – through juridical means. As the international community had tried 
previously many times to stop the war (and to prevent war crimes) the newly established 
international tribunal did not impress observers initially. According to the American Assistant 
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, the Tribunal was “widely viewed as little more than a 
public relations device”.47 One of the strongest proponents of the Tribunal, then United States 
Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, affirmed that: “There seemed to be a 
reasonable chance that the tribunal would fail and that once again the world community 
would be accused of promising much but doing little.”48 The French journalist and tribunal-
watcher, Pierre Hazan wrote:  
                                                
44
 SC Resolution 827 (1993). 
45
 Ibidem. 
46
 Ibidem. 
47
 Richard Holbrooke, “To End A War”  (New York 1999) 189-190. 
48
 Madeleine Albright, “Mevrouw de Minister. Het persoonlijke verhaal van de machtigste vrouw van de VS” 
(Amsterdam 2004) 194. English translation by the author. According to Albright - one of the most committed 
proponents of the tribunal - almost everyone reacted skeptically as to whether another UN bureaucratic 
institution could and would be useful. When it was established, nobody believed that it would work. The media 
saw the court as a distraction - because the world community did not intervene in the massacres that were 
occurring in the Balkans. See also NRC Handelsblad, dated 11 maart 2006, “Dossiers, Joegoslavië Tribunaal", 
at: http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/joegoslavie_tribunaal/, viewed 11 February 2009. In Albright’s words before the 
ICTY Trial Chamber: “It was easy enough to take the first vote in February [1993] to get the Tribunal created, 
but nobody really believed that it would work. There were questions about how the Judges would be selected … 
And then a question was how to get a prosecutor. And that was very complicated, and nobody thought that 
would happen. And then nobody thought that there would ever be a court that actually functioned, that would be 
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“The establishment of the ICTY makes a show of addressing itself to the 
people of the Balkans, and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. In 
reality, its objective is less to ‘deter’ and to ‘reconcile’ Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosnians than to comfort Western public opinion through the judgment of 
a handful of criminals.”49  
 
The Tribunal was born into this skeptical environment. Established in The Hague, in 
The Netherlands, the courtroom was located more than 1,500 kilometres from the region over 
which it had jurisdiction.  
As time passed, it became clear that the international court could not work effectively 
while the war in the former Yugoslavia was still raging. It appeared that the skeptics were 
right. In 1995, the Croatian army launched ‘Operation Storm’, and conquered the Krajina 
area. Approximately 150,000 to 200,000 ethnic Serbs fled the approaching Croatian forces to 
Serb-held parts of Bosnia and Serbia.50 It was one of the most efficient ethnic cleansing 
operations of the Balkans. 
However, the war completely transformed by the end of 1995. On 28 August 1995 a 
mortar shell fired by the Army of Republika Srpska landed on civilians in the crowded market 
of Sarajevo. The television crews on the scene filmed the hellish scene including the blood 
and body parts. By that time the long and bloody siege of Sarajevo had resulted in the deaths 
of at least 10,000 people, including almost 1,800 children.51 Because of the massacre of 
innocent civilians, international politicians felt they had to act: As soon as technical and 
weather conditions allowed, NATO Operation “Deliberate Force” commenced. Because of 
the successful Croatian military operation Storm, the Bosnian-Serbs already had lost the 
initiative on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The wide NATO air strikes against Bosnian-Serb 
infrastructure and units compelled the Bosnian-Serbs to negotiate for peace. By the end of 
1995, all warring parties were ready to negotiate peace.52 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
set on what the precedents were going to be. And we then in May [1993] voted how the procedure of the 
Tribunal would work. And then still nobody thought it would work. They said that would never be indictees, and 
then they said there would never be any trials, and then they said there would never be any convictions, and there 
would never be any sentencing…”. See Mirko Klarin, “The Tribunal’s Four Battles”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, Vol.2, No.2 (2004) 546-557. 
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 See also The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Ante Gotovina Indictment, Case No: IT-01-45-I, at 
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/got-ii010608e.htm, viewed 20 June 2009, 15:15. 
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 See also BBC News report by Jim Fish, "Sarajevo massacre remembered", at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3459965.stm, viewed 10 March 2009, 16:30. 
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The Tribunal is both independent of and dependent on the States of the 
International Community. 
Judge Claude Jorda53 
Chapter 1: The ICTY 1993-1999 
The ICTY pre-operational (1993-1994)   
The practical problems facing the ICTY at its inception appeared endless: to grow from a 
paper report of 35 pages54 to an active international prosecutorial and juridical body it needed 
judges, a prosecutor, a registrar, investigative and support staff, an extensive interpretation 
and translation system, a legal aid structure, premises, equipment, courtrooms, detention 
facilities, guards and all the related funding.55 When it was formally established by Resolution 
827 in May 1993, it was not even certain if The Hague would be the seat of the Tribunal.56 
 
Election of Judges and Establishment of Rules and Procedures 
On 16 September 1993, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that, as of that 
date, the war in Yugoslavia produced 3,6 million refugees.57 The UN negotiator Thorvald 
Stoltenberg reported 200,000 dead.58 By then, a new war had started in Bosnia between two 
former allies, the Bosniaks (Bosnian-Muslims)59 and Bosnian-Croats. While Croats in Bosnia 
shelled the Bosniaks in Mostar, the General Assembly rejected any of the judges that could be 
accused of religious or cultural sympathy towards any of the warring parties. But by the end 
of September 1993, the UN General Assembly had elected eleven judges. 
Two months later, on 17 November 1993, the newly elected judges met in The Hague. 
In the Peace Palace of The Hague, the judges elected the Italian judge Antonio Cassese as the 
first president of the ICTY.60 During their first months, the judges created the internal 
                                                
53
 See press release of 20 November 2000, "Speech by his Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the 
International Criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the UN General Assembly." at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7806, viewed 24 June 2009, 13:30. 
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 See Annex 4: Statute of the ICTY. 
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 See 1994 Annual ICTY Report, S/1994/1007, 15. 
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 See UN SC Resolution 827 (1993). 
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 Hazan, “Justice in a Time of War”, 43. 
58
 Ibidem, see also The New York Times article by Stephen Kinzer, "Bosnian Muslims and Serbs Agree to Four-
Month Truce" of 1 January 1995, at: http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/01/world/bosnian-muslims-and-serbs-
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 President Cassese remembered that for the inauguration ceremony “the UN hired judges robes at a local tailor 
for 25 gvuilders each”. According to the first President of the Tribunal were the hired robes "symbolic" as “the 
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procedures of the court. Within four months the rules of procedure and evidence of the court 
and rules governing the detention of persons awaiting trial were adopted by the judges.61 A 
Headquarters Agreement was negotiated with the government of The Netherlands – making 
The Hague the seat of the Tribunal.62 The judges also drafted internal regulations for each 
department of the Tribunal, such as the Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS).63 At this 
point, the ICTY was barely noticed outside The Hague. The new court needed cases and it 
needed defendants. For this, however, the ICTY needed a prosecutor. 
 
Appointment of a Prosecutor 
On 21 October 1993 the Security Council appointed the Venezuelan attorney Ramón Escovar 
Salom of Venezuela as the first prosecutor of the ICTY. Four months later, before ever setting 
foot in The Hague, the newly elected prosecutor informed the UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali (1992-1997) that he would no longer be available as he would become minister 
of justice in Venezuela.64 A year after the formal establishment of the ICTY, the Security 
Council appointed the South African judge Richard Goldstone as ICTY prosecutor. Several 
months after appointing Goldstone, the Security Council decided to increase the mandate of 
the prosecutor by including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) under 
his prosecutorial authority.65 
By July of 1994, the ICTY had a registrar, judges and a prosecutor, but it still had 
difficulties recruiting the supporting staff. By the time Goldstone was appointed, the 
Australian deputy prosecutor Graham Blewitt had hired eleven employees for the Office for 
the Prosecution (“OTP”).66 Where in many national courts, eleven people investigate one 
murder case, the eleven employees of the OTP had to investigate hundreds of thousands of 
                                                                                                                                                   
UN did not want to spend money at the trial of war criminals from former Yugoslavia". Translation by the 
author. See Cees Banning and Petra De Koning, “Balkan aan de Noordzee. Over het Joegoslavië-tribunaal, over 
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 See the Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, S/1994/1007, 17. 
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 See the 1994 Annual Report of the ICTY, S/1994/1007, 44-45. 
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 See the 1995 Annual Report of the ICTY, S/1995/728, 27-28. 
64
 See Banning and De Koning, “Balkan aan de Noordzee”, 33 and the Annual ICTY Report of 1994, 
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Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by Resolution 955 of 8 
November 1994. See also the ICTR website at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm, viewed 20 June 2009, 16:45. 
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 Hazan, “Justice in a Time of War”, 53. 
 19 
murder cases in a region half the size of France, where the fighting continued heavily and 
where they had no authority.67 
The recruitment problems had a financial background: as the Tribunal was funded 
through a temporary budget, it could not agree to any long term commitments.68 As a result of 
insufficient funding, the new court could not offer any long term contracts for its employees 
nor could it engage in long term contracts for premises or services. Although the jurisdiction 
of the ICTY prosecutor had been effectively doubled with the inclusion of ICTR cases, the 
budget of the Tribunal was temporary and insufficient: the ICTY received just 11 million 
dollars from the General Assembly for its first year.  To put this into context: the expense for 
a court management computer system for the OTP represented 2.3 million of the 11 million 
dollar budget.69 
When the budget for the Tribunal was finally approved by the General Assembly in 
New York, the ICTY became more viable. The Tribunal leased a wing in the Aegon building 
in The Hague and began building a modern courtroom.  The Tribunal commenced the 
building of the detention unit within a Dutch prison in Scheveningen, near the Tribunal 
premises. Crucial assistance came by voluntary contributions by various UN member states. 
Several states provided the OTP with a loan of personnel. In particular, the expansion of the 
prosecutors office gave the Tribunal more credibility. The Tribunal grew further when the 
registrar in The Hague received the authority to engage staff directly rather than through the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York. Thus, after the initial budgetary considerations 
and recruitment difficulties, by July of 1994 the foundations for the ICTY were finally in 
place.70 
The Goldstone era (1994-1996) 
When the newly elected prosecutor Richard Goldstone arrived in The Hague, he immediately 
received criticism from the media: on his first working day Goldstone was interviewed by the 
U.S. television program 60 Minutes which named the segment of its programme on ICTY “An 
Exercise in Hypocrisy”.71 It was not only the media, but also the UN who pressured this 
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 See the whole book of Michael Scharf, “Balkan Justice. The Story Behind the First International War Crimes 
Trial Since Nuremberg” (Durham, North Carolina 1997) for more information concerning the first prosecutors at 
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 See Banning and De Koning, “Balkan aan de Noordzee”, 52. 
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expensive Tribunal to succeed.72 Goldstone realized that after more than a year of its 
existence, the ICTY still needed to produce results: the prison needed detainees and the court 
needed accused. But before arresting suspected war criminals, the prosecutors first had to start 
indicting them. 
To instigate the prosecutions, Goldstone formulated a so-called “pyramid indictment 
strategy”.73 In this prosecution plan, the ICTY prosecutors would investigate many lower and 
intermediate level perpetrators of war crimes. In time, Goldstone intended to indict the 
persons higher-up in the chain-of-command. The strategy of the prosecution caused the first 
conflict within the Tribunal. The judges disagreed with the indictment strategy since, given its 
ad hoc and temporary nature, the ICTY would not have enough time to prosecute lower and 
intermediate level perpetrators and still have enough time and resources for the “bigger fish”. 
After the presentation of the pyramid indictment scheme, the judges immediately issued a 
press release expressing their anxiousness with the formulated strategy.74  
Although the media, the United Nations and the ICTY judges were skeptical of the 
prosecutorial strategy, prosecutor Goldstone started issuing indictments against “secondary” 
suspected war criminals. On 4 November 1994 – within four months after the election of 
Goldstone - the OTP issued its first indictment against the Bosnian-Serb concentration camp 
commander Dragan Nikolić.75 The second indictment followed on 13 February 1995 against a 
group of 21 Bosnian-Serbs who were charged with committing atrocities against Muslim and 
Croat civilian prisoners held at Omarska prison camp in the Prijedor district, where under 
brutal conditions, more than 3,000 Bosniaks and Bosnian-Croats were detained.76 In that 
prison camp, many had been murdered, raped, sexually assaulted, and severely beaten. One of 
the 21 accused, the Bosnian-Serb Duško Tadić, had been arrested by the German authorities 
even before the ICTY issued its indictment.77 Before the German government could transfer 
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Tadić, the German parliament had to enact legislation concerning cooperation with the 
Tribunal. It was on 26 April 1995 – almost a year after the presentation of the prosecutorial 
strategy - that the first accused of the ICTY made his initial appearance before the Trial 
Chamber.78   
 During the same month that the refugees were being executed in Srebrenica, the 
prosecutors of the Tribunal issued five indictments; one against the Bosnian-Serb camp 
commander Duško Sikirica and his 12 subordinates, accusing them of killing, sexually 
assaulting and torturing detainees of the Keraterm prison camp; one indicting six persons with 
56 separate charges for their role in the campaign of terror against the non-Serb civilian 
population in Bosanski Šamac in northern Bosnia; and one indictment accusing two prison 
commanders, Goran Jelisić and Ranko Češić, for their crimes against Bosniak and Croat 
detainees in Luka camp in Brčko. Some days later, the Tribunal confirmed the indictment 
against the self proclaimed president of the Croatian-Serb administration in Krajina, Milan 
Martić, accusing him of ordering a cluster bomb rocket attack against the civilian population 
in the Croatian capital Zagreb in May 1995.  On 25 July 1995, the Office of the Prosecutor 
indicted the Bosnian-Serb leaders Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić for events preceding 
Srebrenica, such as the atrocities perpetrated against civilian population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the sniping campaign against civilians of Sarajevo and the taking of UN 
Peacekeepers as hostages and using them as human shields. On 16 November 1995, an 
additional indictment was confirmed, accusing both Bosnian-Serb leaders of direct 
responsibility for the genocide in Srebrenica.79 
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 During 1995, the Tribunal judges confirmed eight indictments against 46 individuals 
and issued 46 arrest warrants. As the Tribunal had no authority to arrest the accused, it gave 
the arrest warrants to the various embassies and official representatives. However, some 
entities had no official representation and others did not desire the documents.80 The result of 
the indictments and arrest warrants were consequently limited.  
 By indicting suspected war criminals, the ICTY had the power to stigmatise them but 
it could not force the authorities of the region to arrest the accused. Accordingly, Richard 
Holbrooke, the American Assistant Secretary of State who negotiated for peace with the 
leaders of the region, barred two of the indicted local leaders, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko 
Mladić from participation in any international peace conference.81  
The reactions to the indictments were diverse; the media coverage was usually positive 
towards the work of the Tribunal, but it often stressed the ineffectiveness of the arrest 
warrants issued. But many politicians thought the indictments complicated the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia further and as such, politicians often were negative about the work of the 
Tribunal. In particular, the countries that had peacekeepers in the region, such as France and 
Great-Britain, became hostile to the ICTY. The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, 
expressed “outrage” about the indictment against the Bosnian-Serbian leader Karadžić.82 
Goldstone however emphasised the independence of the prosecution efforts of the ICTY and 
constantly tried to increase the support for the Tribunal.  
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The work of the Tribunal was complicated greatly by the continued warfare in the 
former Yugoslavia. The war hindered ICTY logistics such as the examination of mass graves, 
the calling of witnesses, the conduct of investigations in the field and the execution of arrest 
warrants. The lack of freedom of movement of the ICTY investigators and the continuation of 
hostilities set the prosecution of suspected war criminals aside. 
IFOR, and later the international peacekeepers of SFOR,83 assisted the ICTY 
prosecutors in their investigations of the crime scenes in the region. To better support their 
investigative teams, the OTP opened offices in Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb. As result of 
the first investigations, the publications of the indictments and the progress made in the trial 
chambers, media coverage became more regular.84 However, most media were still skeptical 
about the effectiveness of the Tribunal.85 It was clear that the Tribunal needed detainees, but 
no arrests were being made. 
As time went by, it appeared that the international forces deployed in the region did 
not feel responsible to arrest the indicted war criminals. The peacekeepers were concerned 
that arrests of popular war criminals would provoke unrest and reprisals among the 
populations.86 Although the international army consisted of approximately sixty thousand 
soldiers equipped with the best technology in the world, there was no action on the hunt for 
indicted war criminals, nor did the secret services of the Western states share their evidence 
about war crimes and war criminals.  
Prosecutor Goldstone was becoming increasingly worried about the lack of detainees 
when, on 30 January 1996, the Bosnian-Serb colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic and the Bosnian-
Serb general Djorde Djukic accidentally drove into a Bosniak-controlled zone, where they 
were arrested by the Bosniak authorities for their responsibility in the siege of Sarajevo. 
Although ICTY prosecutors had not indicted the two Bosnian-Serbs, Goldstone requested a 
transfer of custody from the Bosnian authorities to the ICTY.87 When Djorde Djukic refused 
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to appear as a witness, the prosecutors indicted the Bosnian Serb General for his involvement 
in the indiscriminate shelling of Sarajevo civilian areas during which thousands of people had 
been killed. By March 1996, the ICTY had indicted 53 persons, but had only Djukic and 
Tadić in custody. Two month later, the indicted Bosnian-Serb general died of cancer. 
Throughout 1996 the Tribunal continued to issue indictments. In June 1996, the ICTY 
issued its first indictment dealing specifically with sexual offences such as gang rape, torture 
and enslavement of Muslim women.88 The ICTY “Foca” indictment was legally 
groundbreaking as it was the first time that sexual assaults were classified as torture and 
enslavement as a crime against humanity.89 Between July and November 1996, the national 
authorities of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international peacekeeping force 
assisted the ICTY prosecutors with the first exhumation of mass graves.90 The first 
exhumations recovered over 450 bodies from four graves that were linked to massacres in the 
Srebrenica enclave in July 1995 and a fifth mass grave exhumation recovered 200 civilian 
bodies from the Vukovar hospital that had been conquered by the Yugoslav People Army in 
late 1991. The majority of the 650 victims recovered died from multiple gunshot wounds. 
Some were found with their hands bound and a number had been blindfolded prior to 
execution.91 Because of the publicity of the evidence from the mass graves, the Tribunal 
gained public support. 
As of April 1996, 57 arrest warrants had been sent to the national authorities of the 
region, but none had been executed.92 At the end of April 1996, the judges issued a press 
release where they referred to the possibility of sanctions by the Security Council (and to the 
fact that no prior sanction had actually been implemented).  The judges speculated that such 
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sanctions would never be forthcoming.93 The lack of assistance, by regional states and by the 
international community, made the judges of the Tribunal concerned that its mission would 
never be fulfilled.94 The judge elected president of the Tribunal, President Antonio Cassese 
(1993-1997) tried to increase the pressure on the national authorities, and called for a boycott 
on the eve of the Olympic Games at Atlanta.95 
It was a great relief for the ICTY when on 18 March 1996, two accused were captured 
in two different countries:  Zejnil Delalić by the German police and Zdravko Mucić by the 
Austrians. Less than two months later, on 2 May 1996, the indicted Hazim Delić and Esad 
Landžo were arrested by the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and transferred to the 
detention unit of the ICTY. In particular, the arrests of Delić and Landžo were important.  It 
was the first time an arrest warrant of the ICTY had been executed by a state of the region, 
and the first time that persons were arrested for war crimes against Serbs. The four newly 
arrested were prosecuted together and formed the first combined case at the ICTY.  
Combining cases for accused whose alleged crimes shared locations and/or dates would 
become a common practice for the Tribunal.96 
The cooperation of the region was further improved when the Bosnian-Serb Dražen 
Erdemović was transferred to ICTY by the Serbian authorities. The ICTY’s investigators had 
indicted the former executioner Erdemović after he had reported to an Amercian journalist 
with ABC News that his unit had shot "about 1,200" men during a period of 24 hours.  
Erdemović testified on camera concerning his own role in the massacre at Srebrenica, and 
openly admitted killing scores of civilians.  Because of his willingness to talk and the fact that 
he had served under General Mladić, the new detainee was an explosive witness.97 On 31 
                                                
93
 See press release of 26 April 1996 supra 92. 
94
 Ibidem. A year before, the ICTY judges had successfully supported the Tribunal through the issuance of a 
press release. At the end of 1995, the budget of the United Nations was strained and the Organisation requested 
the tribunal to cut its spending. See the NY Times article by Barbara Crossette, "Four Months Into Its Budget 
Year, the U.N. Says It Is Broke", at: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/30/world/four-months-into-its-budget-
year-the-un-says-it-is-broke.html, viewed 29 April 2009, 16:20 and see "Chronology of the UN Financial 
Situation" of http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/224/27239.html, viewed 29 April 2009, 
16:30. The judges requested the ICTY that they be exempted of budgetary constraints otherwise the “[..] flow of 
indictments would cease, leaving heinous crimes to go uninvestigated and unpunished.”. See press release of 9 
October 1995, "The Judges request that the International Tribunal be exempted of budgetary remains.", at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7224, viewed 29 April 2009, 18:00. The judges stated that the existence of the tribunal 
would be at stake if it lacked funds. 
95
 See press release of 13 June 1996, "The President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia calls for a sports boycott.", at http://www.icty.org/sid/7340, viewed 21 June 2009, 12:30. 
96
 The four newly arrested were prosecuted together and formed the first combined case at the ICTY. See (IT-96-
21) Čelebići Camp at http://www.icty.org/cases/party/674/4, viewed 21 June 2009, 12:35. 
97
 See The New York Times article of 13 March 1996 by Jane Perlez, "Serb Leader Expected to Turn Over Key 
War Crimes Suspects", at: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9504EED81639F930A25750C0A960958260 and  see The New 
York Times article of 8 March 1996 by Stephen Engelberg, "U.N. Prosecutor Asks Serbs to Hand Over War-
 26 
May 1996, Dražen Erdemović pleaded guilty to murder as a crime against humanity before 
the Tribunal. On 29 November 1996 the trial chamber of the Tribunal sentenced Dražen 
Erdemović to ten years in prison for his part in the mass killing and genocide at Srebrenica.98 
Within several months the Tribunal had its first guilty plea and first sentence. Contrast this 
trial to the trial of Dusko Tadić, who pleaded not guilty: the pre-trial and trial phase took over 
two years with five years of appeals to follow.99 
As the ICTY had few detainees and even fewer cases, the media did not spend much 
time covering the proceedings. But the ICTY needed publicity to gain more public support to 
persuade states to cooperate with the Tribunal. The ICTY found a solution in Rule 61 of its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence which allowed indictment proceedings (including witness 
testimonies) to be publicized. The Security Council of the UN would be officially informed of 
a State’s lack of cooperation with a Rule 61 warrant.100 On 27 June 1996, almost a year after 
the Srebrenica massacre, the Tribunal held Rule 61 hearings and issued international arrest 
warrants against Mladić and Karadic.101 The testimonies of the French investigator Jean-Rene 
Ruez and several Dutch peacekeepers, and statements of the executioner Dražen Erdemović 
and one of the victims painted a horrendous but remarkably detailed account of the Srebenica 
massacre. The international media suddenly paid more attention to pending arrests of the 
accused war criminals.  
One of the consequences of the increased attention by the media was that the indictees 
became stigmatised as criminals, and were unable to travel beyond international borders.102 
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The international community felt more pressure from the media to arrest the indicted war 
criminals. Pierre Hazan for example asked: “How are we to understand that the most powerful 
armies in the world are incapable of arresting Radovan Karadžić in a territory the size of a 
pocket handkerchief?”103 ICTY’s prosecutor Goldstone requested action from the 
international community:  
 
“[…] imagine feelings of the victims, those who have suffered death in their 
immediate family, who have been raped themselves, or whose wives, or mothers, 
or children have been raped. They are told that the people responsible, who have 
been indicted as suspected war criminals, are going to be left alone, because the 
masters of the armed forces -  60,000 strong, with the most modern weaponry and 
the best intelligence in the world – consider it too dangerous to take action.”104  
 
Although the Tribunal had experienced many hardships, the ICTY nevertheless kept indicting 
suspected war criminals. During 1996, 10 public indictments had been confirmed against 33 
individuals. By August 1996, six of the indicted persons were in custody of the UNDU while 
the Tribunal had confirmed in total eighteen indictments with a total of 75 indictees. But for 
the six detainees, the Tribunal could not confirm that, if convicted, their sentences would be 
enforced. The UNDU was not meant to house convicted war criminals for extended 
sentences; rather, it operates as a holding facility for accused during trial, and for the 
convicted pending transfer to a permanent facility.  The ICTY called on UN Member States to 
enforce sentences within their respective prison systems. However, the majority of the UN 
Member States expressed indifference or unwillingness to assist.105  
When prosecutor Goldstone announced his departure from the ICTY in February 
1996,106 the detention unit of the Tribunal was nearly empty. A day before Richard Goldstone 
left The Netherlands in July 1996 he spoke of a “great frustration and disappointment to all of 
us working in The Hague” that only a small number of the indictees that had been arrested.107 
Although some of the key players had been indicted for the most serious crimes known to 
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human kind – genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and the violations of the laws or customs of war – no arrest had been made by the 
international peacekeeping forces in the field, nor were the three states of the former 
Yugoslavia cooperative in facilitating such arrests.  
At this point, the war in the former Yugoslavia was over and an international 
peacekeeping force had been deployed, but international justice seemed to have failed. It 
appeared that the skeptics of international criminal law had gotten it right. A day before his 
departure, a frustrated Goldstone said:  
 
“What is wanting is political will on the part of the international community. If the 
International Tribunal fails, as it could and probably will, if this continues for long 
enough – if we are not allowed to do the job we were created to do, what is the 
point of keeping the Tribunal going – it will be the end of any thought of enforcing 
International Humanitarian Law for the foreseeable future.”108 
 
"Our primary mission is not to chase war criminal[s]. We have said that on so 
many occasions [that] it's not worth repeating. We will of course cooperate with 
the Tribunal, as we have done. And in the course of our mission [if] we 
[encounter] a war criminal, you can be sure [that] they will be where they should 
be." 
NATO Secretary-General Solana in Sarajevo on 3 January 1997109 
 
“If the Tribunal is not allowed to function effectively, it will not have failed. It will 
have been failed. The international community […] will have forsaken its 
commitment to the rule of law.” 
ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald110 
The Louise Arbour Era (1996-1999) 
The judicial activity of the court had never been so intense when the Canadian Justice Louise 
Arbour started at the ICTY, but many people were still skeptical about the fulfilment of its 
mission.111 When the Canadian prosecutor arrived at The Hague,112 the office of the 
prosecutor had 22 separate ongoing investigations and was prosecuting four cases before the 
trial chambers.113 The Blaškić trial was in pre-trial phase and Dražen Erdemović was 
appealing the first sentence pronounced by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal’s first trial, that of 
Dusco Tadić, was well underway and the first joint trial at the ICTY, the Čelebići trial, had a 
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procedural problem – none of the three presiding judges were re-elected by the General 
Assembly.114 While the level of juridical activity was higher than ever before, the skepticism 
concerning the Tribunal lingered: partly because of the scope of IFOR's mission in the former 
Yugoslavia, partly because the sanction mechanism of the UN Security Council appeared not 
to work and partly because of the uncooperative three states of the region: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. The fact that the Tribunal had only a few detainees in 
custody while it had issued more than seventy indictments, evoked the image of a “virtual 
tribunal”.115 The Tribunal appeared to operate in an international vacuum, where ICTY 
prosecutors indicted persons accused of war crimes but the arrest warrants were ignored, and 
no authority – regional, national or international - proceeded with arrests. Prosecutor Arbour 
became convinced that arrests were vital for the very survival of the ICTY, as she later said:  
 
“Arrest was the issue, and it was clear that if we got people arrested then 
everybody inside the Tribunal would be busy. We would be starting to do what 
we were set up to do, the United Nations would have to continue to support us 
financially and politically, and that’s when we arrived at the point of no 
return.”116 
 
To promote initiative within the international community, Louise Arbour formulated a 
new prosecutorial strategy. A crucial element of the new strategy was that the Tribunal would 
not publicise the indictment, as before, but it would make use of secret indictments. Because 
of the element of surprise, the secret indictments reduced the risks of injuries and deaths 
during arrests. Moreover, if the sealed indictments would be unsealed, the Tribunal could 
reveal that the peacekeepers of IFOR did not meet its responsibilities. Thus, by using the 
secret indictments the prosecutors of the ICTY had more influence and independence. 
The new strategy was applied for the first time when the former mayor of Vukovar, 
Slavko Dokmanović, arrived for what he thought was an appointment with a representative of 
the UN. Dokmanović was unaware of the indictment accusing him of involvement in the 
murder of 260 men taken from a hospital.117 On 27 June 1997, the regional United Nations 
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forces118 arrested Dokmanović and immediately brought him to The Hague. It was the first 
time that the peacekeepers worked so closely with the Tribunal.119 Less than two weeks after 
the arrest of Dokmanović, a British commando team under NATO command arrested the 
secretly indicted Milan Kovacevic.120 That same day, the commando team shot the secretly 
indicted Simo Drljaća dead after the accused fired at the commandos. The arrest of Kovacevic 
was the first arrest of an ICTY accused by NATO forces.121  
The secret indictments and the first arrest by the peacekeepers had a chilling effect on 
the other accused. They began to fear the 60,000 UN peacekeepers.  In addition, a forged 
document was circulated in the region causing mistrust and suspicion of the UN peacekeepers 
– it allegedly indicated that 178 persons were the subject of secret indictments.122 Ten Croats 
who had been indicted in public by the Tribunal suddenly turned themselves in.123 From 
October 1997 until June 1998, almost every month one or two accused was arrested and 
transferred to The Hague. At that point, the Tribunal had succeeded beyond its physical 
capacity: in June 1998, there were more than 30 detainees in the 24 cells of the Tribunal’s 
detention unit. 
Since its existence, the ICTY had found itself constantly struggling for an appropriate 
budget, but when the detainees suddenly started to arrive in the UN detention unit, the 
financial situation of the ICTY became critical. The new president of the ICTY, the American 
judge Gabrielle McDonald (1997-1999), urgently asked the Security Council for more funds 
to establish additional courtrooms and to expand the prison cells, and proposed more judges 
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to be selected.124 Because of lacking resources, Prosecutor Arbour changed the prosecutorial 
policy to focus on only the most brutal and senior indictees and removed the charges against 
14 lower ranking accused.125 The ICTY lobby produced the desired results: by mid 1998, 
voluntary contributions from various states allowed two more courtrooms to be 
constructed.126 During Arbour’s prosecuting term, 1996-1999, the annual UN budget for the 
ICTY had more than tripled from about thirty million to nearly one hundred million dollars.127  
 
The war in Kosovo 
The budget of the ICTY did not increase only because of the lobby of the ICTY 
representatives. Increasingly the Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević, was held responsible 
for causing so much suffering, and the ICTY appeared as a solution to quell the war crimes 
being committed in Kosovo. As the situation in Kosovo escalated, the support for the ICTY 
by the international community increased.128 
The support for the ICTY accelerated when Human Rights Watch reported a massacre 
of approximately forty male Albanians in the town of Račak, and Louise Arbour went to the 
region to investigate. On 17 January 1999, amidst a crowd of journalists and television crews, 
Arbour and her investigative team gave a Serbian custom officer her ICTY papers and 
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requested entry to Kosovo. When the Serbian guard refused her entry to Kosovo, the image of 
the helpless prosecutor went around the world.129  
After she was refused admission to Kosovo, Arbour was ready to resign: 
 
 “I was completely discouraged and started drafting my letter of resignation […] I 
had taken it physically to the end of the road and in a real sense: when I turned 
around, there was nobody behind me. NATO wasn’t there, the Security Council 
wasn’t there […]”130  
 
But although Arbour had lost the “border battle”, the prosecutor later realised that she 
had won the “media war”: the Račak massacre brought renewed international attention to the 
conflict in Kosovo.131 Within weeks of the Račak massacre, an international conference was 
arranged at the French castle Rambouillet.  The Serbian delegation refused to sign the 
‘Rambouillet Accords’. As a result, NATO started to bomb the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY).132 
In January 1999 – the same month as the massacre in Račak – the prosecutors of the 
ICTY started drafting an indictment against Milošević.133 ICTY investigators were on the 
border of Kosovo building up their case by taking testimonies of Albanian refugees. It was 
clear that Milošević was not only the instigator of the war against the Albanian rebels, the 
Serbian president was also in the line of command judicially. Because of the Tribunal’s 
increased international support, the prosecutors of the ICTY received information from 
several secret service agencies from western states as well as institutions such as NATO.134 
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After fifty-two days, the ICTY confirmed the indictment against the Serbian president, 
Slobodan Milošević.135 The first time that a sitting president was indicted by a UN tribunal 
was reported by the press all over the world.  
Because of the war in Kosovo and the issuance of the indictment against Slobedan 
Milošević, the ICTY gained momentum: never before in its history did the ICTY receive so 
much attention.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
seriously. I expect to be provided with this information on a continuous basis, not only from these sources but 
from all governments, international organisations, NGOs and private individuals who are committed to peace 
and justice, and the dispassionate pursuit of truth.”.  
135
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Chapter 2 Criticism from the Balkans, 1993-1999 
By 1999 the ICTY had become a fully functioning international criminal court.136 However, 
within the UN the ICTY was criticised for its lack of outreach.  In a review of the 
effectiveness of the ICTY, the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions (‘ACABQ’) concluded that:  
 
“it is likely that, except for a very small proportion of the population of the former 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere, there is large-scale, if not total, lack of knowledge 
regarding the international humanitarian laws enforced by the ICTY”.137 (emphasis 
added). 
 
The rules and procedures of the ICTY were not known by the peoples that the Tribunal was 
established to serve. The Tribunal was remote from the affected communities, and entirely 
foreign to local notions of justice. Studies about the effectiveness of the ICTY were critical. 
In 1999, a survey conducted among Bosnian non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) 
showed that NGOs had received little information on the Tribunal and that they felt remote 
from it.138 Over 60 percent of the interviewed NGOs did not know what laws govern war 
crimes and 66 percent had not received any information about the kind of war crimes for 
which one can be indicted.139 In the same year an interview study had been conducted among 
Bosnian judges and prosecutors which revealed negative local perceptions of the Tribunal.140 
Just as with the local NGO’s, the Bosnian legal professionals felt marginalized by a procedure 
of which they lacked any clear understanding. Another survey conducted at the same time 
highlighted the “striking lack of understanding by most of the participants of the procedures 
and work of the Tribunal.”141 The general perception of the Tribunal, especially among 
Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-Croat judges and prosecutors, was that the ICTY was a biased, 
political organization incapable of providing fair trials. The majority of Bosnian legal 
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professionals perceived the ICTY as a contemporary form of “victor’s justice” and an 
“illegitimate instrument of the great powers.” An ACABQ report commissioned by the UN 
General Assembly advised for more transparency and accessibility of the ICTY.142 
Even within the Tribunal, staff members started to criticize the course of action of the 
Tribunal. For example, Paul Stuebner, staff member of the OTP, stated:  
 
“In 1995, we received some requests from Sarajevo, from Banja Luka, from 
Belgrade, from the different faculties of law in the former Yugoslavia. They asked 
us to give them courses on the tribunal, to explain its statutes and functioning, but 
the prosecutor was never interested. A lot of material was never even translated 
into the local languages. When the Tadić judgment was finally translated [into the 
regional language(s)] two and a half years later after the verdict, it was already on 
the point of being obsolete, since the Chamber of Appeal was also in the process 
of making its ruling. There was an inexplicable lack of interest in getting our 
message across.”143  
 
The Tribunal watcher Hazan noted that:  
 
“this absence of will to explain the ICTY’s work to the people most concerned by 
it is one of the most important failures of the Tribunal at The Hague”.144  
 
 The clearest example of neglect of the population of the former Yugoslavia was that 
up to 1999, the ICTY had produced its documents only into the two working languages of the 
Tribunal: English and French. Only in 1999 did the ICTY announce that documents would be 
translated into Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.145 Years later, the ICTY announced that it 
would translate all of its documents also into Albanian. The fact that it was not until six years 
after its establishment that ICTY undertook to translate its publications, documents, press 
releases and judgements into Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian (‘BCS’) indicates clearly that the 
Tribunal had overlooked the population of the region. 
It can be assumed that the reason the ICTY had overlooked the peoples of the region 
was because its essential audience was in the West rather than in the Balkans. As a UN 
institution, the ICTY mainly looked to its UN headquarters in New York, for guidance, 
administrative authority, support and in the constant struggle for an adequate budget.146  
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Many ICTY employees were unacquainted with the conflict of the former Yugoslavia.  
ICTY employees were recruited from countries over the world, as is the case with all United 
Nations staff, with a certain concentration of Dutch nationals resulting from its location in 
The Hague.147 Only a small number of employees understood the very complex war in the 
former Yugoslavia.  Most employees perceived the fast developments in the conflict of the 
Balkans as complicated and confusing. Even high representatives of the Tribunal, such as 
judges, were sometimes poorly informed concerning the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.148 
When the ICTY issued reports, they were directed mostly towards its Western audience - 
which was also its principal funding source, its political support and its cultural origin. 
Prosecutor Louise Arbour recognized this when she said: 
 
“if there was one thing to redo, and if we were sure of the Tribunal’s growth, I 
would have my staff learn Serbo-Croatian, so that they could better understand the 
documents, so that the people would no longer be such strangers. It is very 
frustrating to work in a language that you do not master. There is something of the 
culture, of the history, of the emotion that is necessary to us”.149 
 
Adding to the difficulty was the fact that many ICTY judges, prosecutors, 
investigators and the numerous legal officers supporting all sections came from national 
courts where they did not have to explain their work to the public. The Tribunal was a unique 
international tribunal but the employees who were recruited often continued in their familiar 
national manner. The unique ICTY required unique communicative court methods, such as a 
public relation office for the region.150 Consequently, the rules and procedures of the ICTY 
became a legal specialty – international war crimes – withdrawn into itself.  
The ACABQ report recommended the ICTY to be more accessible and more 
transparent to the affected communities.151 The judge elected President of the Tribunal, 
Gabrielle McDonald, decided to create a special section within the Tribunal that would inform 
and engage with the people in the former Yugoslavia. As such, it was in 1999, six years after 
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its establishment, that the Tribunal decided to establish an “Outreach” program to “reach out” 
to the population of the region. 
It had taken six years before the ICTY became aware that what it was doing had very 
little resonance within the affected communities of the former Yugoslavia. Only the work of 
the prosecutor required direct contact with the local communities.  OTP employees had a 
daily contact with victims, witnesses, local governments and NGO’s. But the office of the 
prosecutor was too understaffed to explain its work and the confidentiality of the investigation 
process excluded public openness. By 1999, most peoples of the former Yugoslavia felt 
disconnected from the ICTY.  
The isolation of the court from the people of the former Yugoslavia was partly due to 
the location of the international court. When the ICTY was established, it was uncertain 
where the court would be established but by May 1993 one thing was clear: the ICTY could 
not be set up in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In 1993 with the war still raging, the 
country was torn between ethnic rivalries and no regional authority could confirm safety nor 
security. But one of the obvious disadvantages of the location in The Hague was the distance 
of the court to its region of jurisdiction: more than 1,500 km.  
The Tribunal’s results were experienced far from the former Yugoslavia. The people 
of the region had many misconceptions and misunderstandings of the work and procedures of 
the ICTY.152 As the ICTY was never explained to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, the 
media in the Balkan had to explain the workings of the Tribunal for them, largely to the 
disadvantage of the ICTY.  
The role of the media 
Since its inception, the ICTY offered courtroom recordings to press and media. The media of 
the Balkans, however, interpreted the existence, procedures and proceedings of the 
international Tribunal differently than it intended. Each of the three states had a different 
agenda and explained the war in the former Yugoslavia differently. Consequently, Croatian 
media, Bosnian media and Serbian media all had a different interpretation of the ICTY and 
international justice. When the media in the Balkans broadcast ICTY’s court TV, they often 
did so selectively. The ICTY offered complete trials to the media, but the media in the 
Balkans used only small selections or quotations within often critical news segments. 
The coverage of ICTY trials was complicated because the procedures and proceedings 
of the ICTY were complicated. The ICTY used an unfamiliar mix of common law as used in 
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Anglo-Saxon countries and civil law as used in many European countries (including the 
countries that formely made up Yugoslavia). Moreover, the ICTY commenced in 26 April 
1995 (with the initial appearance of Dusko Tadić) with a compelling start (the guilty plea of 
the defendant) but after only a few days of coverage, boredom triumphed. The ICTY used 
more than a year to prepare the pre-trial phase and clarify the law and facts of the case, but it 
was not until 7 May 1996 that the case, (the Tribunal’s first) commenced. Other ICTY cases 
were often also unexciting for the majority of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. The 
seniority level of the defendants was low and the proceedings were complex and slow. So, the 
cases of the international Tribunal did not receive much attention from the local media.153 
Each media outlet in the Balkan countries often had an agenda of its own. In the years 
preceding the outbreak of war in 1991, during the years of fighting and in the first two years 
of peace (1995-1997), the media in the Balkans were able to behave with impunity. Because 
of political support and financial assistance from the leaders in the Balkan countries, the 
media became one of the crucial weapons in the conflict.  Even when the war had ended,  the 
media did not stop supporting the extreme nationalistic views. Even in the communistic 
Yugoslavia, media had been an instrument of the ruling elite to explain their views to the 
oppressed population.154 As the conflict escalated and as Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 
beginning of the nineties, the media of the various republics served increasingly less to inform 
the population and increasingly more to encourage and strengthen the support for the opinion 
of their political leaders. Since there were few alternative sources of information, the media 
that was backed by the political leaders became the prime supplier of information and the 
prime supplier of interpretation. While the media supported their political leaders, the 
common man became increasingly indoctrinated with the extreme nationalistic propaganda 
views offered by the local media.  
When the ICTY was established on 25 May 1993, the war in the former Yugoslavia - 
and the media war - was still raging. By then, all different ethnic communities had used media 
propaganda for years to brainwash their citizens of the nationalistic party line. Within each 
ethnic community, nationalistic extremist reasoned that the “other” ethnic community was the 
perpetrator of old (sometimes ancient) crimes. Nationalistic propaganda often asserted that 
each member of a community carried the collective guilt of its ethnic group. As a result, the 
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nationalistic propaganda asserted that the people in the former Yugoslavia had to take 
vengeance on the “Turks” (Muslim), the Ustašes (Croats) or the Chetniks (Serbs). In this way, 
aggressors often saw themselves either as victims or as “correctors” of ancient crimes left 
unpunished.155 As all three sides considered their own community to be the victim of the war, 
and all three sides believed that justice could only occur if members of the other ethnic 
community would be prosecuted.  
But during the crucial period when the ICTY should have explained its mandate and 
its functioning to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal was completely 
preoccupied with internal UN difficulties, such as recruitment issues, funding and the 
selection of a prosecutor. When the first indictment of the ICTY was issued at the end of 
1994, the people of the former Yugoslavia were either ignorant or largely skeptical toward the 
Tribunal. But because the first indictment was against an ethnic Serb, the media in Croatia 
and Bosnia were interested.156 The accusation by the ICTY prosecutors supported their 
interpretation of the war.  
The attitude of the media towards the ICTY changed on 14 December 1995, when the 
Dayton peace agreement was signed.157 With this historic peace agreement, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia were obligated by law to cooperate with the ICTY. Because 
the ICTY was imposed by the UN Security Council on the region, the court in The Hague was 
often portrayed by the media of the region as an external imposition. But although the three 
Balkan states had signed the Dayton agreement - and agreed to cooperate with the Tribunal – 
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the local media still portrayed the ICTY as an institution that was established as part of an 
international conspiracy against their sovereignty.  
Conspiracy theories have always been common in the region, particularly in Serbia, so 
when the media reported ICTY as part of an international scheme against Serbs these views 
were quickly accepted by many Serbs.158 Not only the Serbian people were receptive to 
conspiracies: Croats and Bosniaks also often believed in conspiracies. After the rise of the 
Serbian president Milošević through the populistic and nationalistic anti-bureaucratic 
revolution, the Serbian president gained control and influence effectively in four out of the 
eight republics and autonomous provinces of the Yugoslav federation.159 The overturned 
balance of power in the Yugoslavian federation provoked separatism and extremism within all 
republics of the federation. The elections of 1990 were in all republics won by nationalistic, 
often xenophobic, parties that desired separation from the Yugoslavian federation. These 
xenophobic separatists interpreted the ICTY as an instrument of an international 
conspiracy.160 The voluntary contributions and donations of the US, and the fact that the US 
had sent dozens of prosecutors on loan to the Tribunal were often depicted by the Balkan 
media as making the court dependent on US politics. The secondments of national personnel, 
while giving credibility to the OTP, fuelled these theories even further, as the US (along with 
the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) was one of the largest 
contributor of staff. Moreover, the US was the fourth largest contributor to the ICTY, with 
only Malaysia, Italy, and Pakistan above.  
By the time that the states of the former Yugoslavia signed on to cooperate with the 
ICTY under the Dayton Accords, many people of the region were already convinced that the 
Tribunal was an instrument of an international conspiracy. While the ICTY began to request 
assistance of the states of the region, it never explained its mandate nor the workings nor the 
reasons for the existence of the court to the people of the region.  
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Cooperation of the region with ICTY 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was optimistic about an international tribunal 
even before the Tribunal was established. By then, the military situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was desperate.161 When the ICTY was established, the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had lost 70 per cent of its territory to the Bosnian-Serbs. Moreover, the alliance 
with the Bosnian-Croats deteriorated quickly, escalating in 1994 in a full-scale war between 
the Bosniaks and the Bosnian-Croats. As the Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina became 
increasingly isolated by the Bosnian-Serbs and the Bosnian-Croats, international support 
could significantly change the war. By cooperating with the ICTY, the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina hoped to gain more international support for its cause. Moreover, as most of the 
victims of war crimes were Muslims the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had much to gain 
and little to fear from an international tribunal.  
Internationally, the ICTY was also perceived as a defender of the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In its first years, the largest part of the voluntary contributions to the ICTY were 
from Islamic countries such as Malaysia, which in 1995 gave 2 million dollars, and Pakistan 
which gave 1 million dollars.162 The initial indictments appeared to support the idea of 
partiality of the Tribunal as all the accused had either Serb or Croat ethnicity. When the OTP 
first commenced their work at the end of 1994, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
immediately responded favourably to requests by the Tribunal.163  
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The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina complied with the Tribunals request to defer 
local investigations and prosecution of a group of Bosnian-Croats who were suspected of 
having murdered over 100 Bosniaks in the Lasva Valley. By acting accordingly, the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina became the first state that recognised the primacy of the 
Tribunal in theory and in practise.164 In early 1995, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
agreed to defer the national cases against three ethnic Bosnian-Serbs: president Karadžic, 
general Mladić and the Chief of the State Security Services Stanišic. In the spring of 1996, the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina informed prosecutor Goldstone that they would provide 
approximately 1,500 local cases for review by the Tribunal. 
The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most cooperative party of the various 
states (and various entities) of the former Yugoslavia, responding to nearly every arrest 
warrant addressed to it or explaining its inability to do so in territories outside its control. In 
May 1996, this cooperation resulted in the arrest of Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo, which led 
to the first ICTY indictment dealing with Bosnian-Serbian victims.165 The Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed an office to be established in Sarajevo and it provided 
investigators of the Tribunal access to crime sites and relevant persons.166 Later in the 
nineties, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina executed search warrants of the ICTY.167 
Unfortunately, when the Tadić trial was well underway it appeared that the Federation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina did more than what was legally permissible. The defence proved that 
Dragan Opačić, a witness of the prosecution had lied about his testimony in court. Later 
Opacic asserted that his evidence had been fabricated at the instigation of the authorities of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.168 The false testimony during the first trial of the ICTY not only 
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embarrassed the Tribunal but it stressed the relationship with the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. (Predominantly Serbian) claims that the ICTY was a “show-court” suddenly 
appeared correct. 
Although the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina cooperated with the Tribunal, the 
Federation did not control all the territory of the state Bosnia-Herzegovina. At Dayton it was 
decided that the Bosnian-Serbs would control 49 percent of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina which was named ‘Republika Srpska’.169 When the Dayton agreement was 
implemented, at the end of 1995, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had no influence in 
this Bosnian-Serb controlled part of the country. 
Republika Srpska 
The Bosnian-Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been responsible for most crimes against 
international humanitarian law during the war, and had been responsible for the most brutal 
crimes.  It is not surprising then that the authorities of Republika Srpska were against an 
international war crimes court. With help of the local politicians, the local media initiated a 
campaign against the ICTY. The authorities of Republika Srpska did not recognise the 
primacy of the ICTY and consequently did not arrest any ICTY indictee.170  
 Representatives of Republika Srpska refused to meet ICTY representatives because 
they considered the court in The Hague as an illegal court and contested its primacy over 
courts in Republika Srpska.171 OTP investigators were unable to interview witnesses and 
victims in Republika Srpska.172 The only cooperation of Republika Srpska with the ICTY was 
the acceptance of ICTY investigators’ access to crimes sites and more importantly, mass 
grave sites.173 At the same time there were numerous media reports that these mass grave sites 
had been emptied of corpses or otherwise had been tampered with.174 After the realization that 
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Republika Srpska was failing to cooperate even minimally, the ICTY noted in its annual 
report to the General Assembly that arrest and transfer of major indictees would be “a forlorn 
hope”.175 
After the success of the radical nationalistic party at the 1996 elections, cooperation of 
Republika Srpska with the ICTY became even more uncertain. Together with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”, later Serbia and Montenegro) the authorities of Republika 
Srpska attempted to trump the jurisdiction of the ICTY by proposing to try the ICTY indictees 
in their own territory.176 Almost two years after the issuance of their indictment, three former 
commanders of the Omarska camp were easily located by the media because they were still 
holding public law enforcement positions.177 The two highest-level ICTY indictees, Radovan 
Karadžic´ and Ratko Mladić´, were not arrested by the authorities of Republika Srspka and 
remained in official positions.178 Republika Srpska became a safe haven for ICTY indictees. 
By mid-1997, Republika Srpska had more than 40 indictees in its territory but it had 
“consistently refused to arrest a single one”.179  
Many of the ICTY indicted war criminals, such as Mladić and Karadžic, were 
extremely popular in the region. While the authorities of Republika Srpska maintained that 
they could not find any of the ICTY accused, the Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadžić was 
relentlessly broadcasted on local television.180  
Only in late 1997 did the international peacekeepers deployed in Republika Srpska 
start to assist the Tribunal. When the NATO-led peacekeepers in October 1997 seized the 
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transmitters of Bosnian-Serb television, they deprived the Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan 
Karadžić of his best instrument to communicate and manipulate the Bosnian-Serb citizens of 
Republika Srpska. In addition the NATO action heralded a restructuring of the entire Bosnian 
media. 
However, the ICTY’s relationship with Republika Srpska did not improve 
significantly. In July 1998 the ICTY reported that Republika Srpska supplied indicted accused 
false identification papers.181 
Croatia 
 When the ICTY was established in May 1993, the Croatian army was still fighting the 
Serbs from the Krajina area. Because of the war, the foundation of the ICTY encountered in 
Croatia “almost complete silence of the press”.182 During the 1995 Croatian military 
“Operation Storm” approximately 150,000 to 200,000 Serbs fled the approaching Croat army 
to Serb-held parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.183 The remaining Serbs living in 
Croatia were subjected to harassment by the Croatian authorities with the intent to drive non-
Croats out of Croatia. National prosecutions against war criminals were almost exclusively 
motivated by the ethnicity of the victims and the suspects, and local prosecutors initiated 
many unsubstantiated cases against Serbs living in Croatia.  
Although the Croatian authorities were openly anti-Serbian, the Croatian authorities 
were not openly anti-ICTY. Authorities in Zagreb allowed the opening of an ICTY office, and 
the first investigations in Croatia by the ICTY investigators were not hindered by the local 
authorities.184 The Croatian media became less suspicious towards the ICTY when the first 
indictments were issued and all accused were of the Serbian ethnicity.185 Until November 
1995, only one indictment had been issued against an ethic Croat. 
But the cooperation of the republic of Croatia with the ICTY was reluctant at best. The 
official view of Croatia was that the war was a product of Serbian aggression and all actions 
of the ICTY that could support this view were embraced in Croatia. The first Croatian ICTY 
indictee was in a Croatian prison at the time of the issuance of the indictment but instead of 
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handing him over, the Croatian authorities set him free.186 The relationship between the ICTY 
and Croatia deteriorated quickly when on 10 November 1995 the ICTY issued indictments 
against 21 ethnic Croats. By March 1996, approximately one third of all ICTY accused were 
of Croatian ethnicity. 
Since its parliament did not implement the necessary legislation, the Croatian 
authorities had a legislative argument not to cooperate with ICTY, and used this argument to 
avoid executing arrest warrants of the Tribunal. On 11 November 1995, the day after the 
indictment of the former Croatian general Tihomir Blaškić, the Croatian president Franjo 
Tuñman appointed Blaškić to become the Croatian army's general inspectorate. Croatian 
authorities fully failed to investigate and prosecute the alleged crimes by Croatian forces 
during and after Operation Storm.187 Croatia refused to provide the prosecutors of the ICTY 
with necessary internal documents.188 Like Republika Srpska, the juridical department of the 
Croatian government announced it would try suspected war criminals themselves, announcing 
in January 1996 it would start procedures against more that a thousand Croatian-Serbs.  It 
appeared that Croatia only cooperated with the ICTY when it could accuse ethnic Serbs.189 
 Following the end of the war in Yugoslavia, the regime of Franjo Tuñman repeatedly 
showed contempt for the ICTY and refused to cooperate. Because of this Croatian policy  
towards the ICTY, the state came under increasing international pressure and became 
increasingly isolated from the international community.190 
Only when an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to benefit 
Croatia was postponed did the Croatian government enact a law concerning cooperation with 
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the ICTY.191 The juridical department of the republic of Croatia immediately submitted more 
than 100 national cases to the OTP for review.192 Through mediation of the Croatian 
authorities the former general Tihomir Blaškić surrendered himself to the ICTY.193 On 8 June 
1996, Croatian authorities arrested the indicted Zlatko Aleksovski and transferred him to the 
ICTY.194 In October 1997, ten indicted Croats were arrested by the Croatian authorities, and 
on 6 October 1997, the ten accused surrendered themselves.195  
When the trials of general Tihomir Blaškić and leader Dario Kordić were before the 
ICTY trial chambers, the prosecutorial policy of ”command responsibility” materialised, 
whereby senior officials could be held responsible for the atrocities committed by those under 
their command. But when it appeared that the Croatian president Tuñman and his inner circle 
could be associated with war crimes, Croatia immediately became less cooperative. With the 
Blaškić case in trial phase, the prosecutors of the Tribunal suddenly had problems getting 
information from Croatia.196 The relationship between the ICTY and Croatia deteriorated 
again beginning in 1997. 
Croatia criticized the Tribunal and cooperated only with the greatest reluctance.  
According to prosecutor Arbour, the complaints were “no more than a convenient way to 
evade obligations.197 In 1999, Croatia refused to transfer two ICTY indictees, Vinko 
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Martinovic and Mladen Naletilic to The Hague until they had served their prison sentences in 
Croatia. Only after lengthened negotiations and requests by the ICTY to the Security Council 
to impose sanctions did Croatia agree to their extradition.  
The ICTY showed that the Croatian president and his inner circle were associated with 
war crimes and assisting war criminals. It was not a question of whether Franjo Tuñman 
would be indicted but of when. Thus, Tuñman and his inner circle constantly delayed 
cooperation by Croatia. 
On 10 December 1999, Franjo Tuñman, the “founding father” of independent Croatia 
died, leaving behind a controversial legacy. Tuñman had led Croatia as an independent 
country away from communism and towards democracy. But he had developed Croatia into 
an authoritarian country ruled by a corrupt elite. By December 1999, Croatia had serious 
social-economic problems. One in five Croatians were unemployed while the country had 
become increasingly isolated from the international community as a result of not cooperating 
with the court of the international community.  
Serbia 
When the international community decided to establish a tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
there was no reaction from Serbia. Politicians and media in Serbia explained the war in the 
former Yugoslavia as part of an international conspiracy against Serbs and Serbia and the 
creation of the ICTY fit this picture. Since the war in the former Yugoslavia had been fought 
outside the territory of Serbia, the war had stayed at a distance for the majority of the Serbian 
population. As the Serbian people had no experience with the war, it became easy for the 
Serbian state to manipulate the imagery of the war in general and the role of the ICTY in 
particular.198 Because the international politics and media were generally hostile towards 
Serbs, the people of Serbia believed that the ICTY would be part of a hostile international 
encirclement.  
When the ICTY started to issue the first indictments against ethnic Serbians, it fitted 
the image of an international court against Serbs. The Serbian media accused the court in The 
Hague of having anti-Serbian prejudices and asserted that the Serbs were being unfairly 
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singled out for prosecution by the Tribunal.199 Out of the first 53 indictees, 46 were ethnic 
Serbs and seven were ethnic Croats.200 But in Serbia, people instead believed that Serbs had 
been the victim of the wars and that most war crimes had been committed against Serbs.201 
Prosecutor Goldstone stated that the investigations of his office into allegations of war 
crimes committed against Serb victims were being “hampered” by the low level of 
cooperation from the Yugoslavian government and the Serbian entities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia. The indictments against non-Serbs did not persuade Serbians to 
believe in the impartiality and independence of the court.202  
The Serbian opposition against the ICTY arose partially because of a state controlled 
media campaign. The position of the Yugoslavian army and Yugoslavian politics had been 
that Serbia was not a faction in the war of the former Yugoslavia. But the Karadžić- Mladić 
indictment and the Vukovar indictment made the Serbian regime anxious that the accused in 
these cases might expose links to the leadership of Serbia.203 The Serbian state initiated a 
manipulative news campaign to delegitimize the ICTY and refused to "recognise" the 
ICTY.204 Local juridical authorities asserted that an international tribunal such as the ICTY 
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should have been created by treaty and that they considered the ICTY “illegal”.205 The 
Serbian government prevented its citizens from knowing about war crimes and distorted the 
reality of the crimes. The local media described the ICTY as a vehicle for revenge of the 
international community.206 Because of the state supported media campaign the ICTY was 
rendered even more alien to and remote from the people.  The ICTY appeared irrelevant and 
wrong.207 Under the Dayton Accords, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was also 
responsible for the compliance  (or lack thereof) of Republika Srpska. Instead, the Serbian 
authorities obstructed the ICTY: accused, such as Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, were promoted 
instead of arrested.208  
ICTY indictees used Serbia as a safe haven to escape punishment under international 
law.209 The Serbian authorities had “allowed Bosnian-Serb indictees such as Ratko Mladić´ 
[…] to roam freely on their territory without fear of apprehension”.210 Authorities of FRY and 
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the Republika Srpska constantly hampered the investigations of the ICTY prosecutors.211 
ICTY investigators were not permitted to interview witnesses or victims in Serbia nor 
Republika Srpska.212  
With Serbia the ICTY constantly entered into discussions about the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal. Where Serbia emphasised its own sovereignty, the ICTY emphasized Serbia’s 
agreement under the provisions of the Dayton Accords. When the crisis in Kosovo escalated, 
the poor relationship between the ICTY and Serbia was intensified. According to the Serbian 
government, ICTY investigations into war crimes in Kosovo represented a violation of the 
sovereignty of Serbia.213  
 While ICTY prosecutors were blocked access to the crime scenes, war crimes within 
the territory of Serbia continued. At the end of 1998 president McDonald reported that the 
relationship between Serbia and the ICTY was characterised “by near-total non-
compliance”.214 Nearly a month later the ICTY President said that Serbia had become “a 
rogue State" and wrote a letter to the Security Council, as prosecutor Arbour again was 
refused a visa to the Serbian province Kosovo.215 Because the Serb government refused to 
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cooperate with the Tribunal indictments, including the indictment against the paramilitary 
leader Željko Ražnatović (also known as “Arkan”), were not served in the FRY. 
By the end of the nineties the ICTY had become a full juridical institution that was 
beginning to have an impact on the former Yugoslavia.216 By 1999, the ICTY had developed 
into a “mature”court, conscious of its potential and its responsibilities. The Serbian regime 
meanwhile had lost most of its credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world: international 
politicians were convinced during the third Balkan war that the Yugoslavian president 
Milošević was an obstacle for a peace process in the Balkans.217 However, those in the peace 
process and the prosecutors of the ICTY were well aware of the political difficulties of 
indicting a sitting head of state.218 
Although the regime of the Serbian president Milošević had tried on numerous 
occasions to call off the ICTY investigations and prosecutions, the prosecutors were confident 
enough to accuse the most senior leaders responsible for the crimes that were being 
committed in the war in Kosovo. The ICTY indicted exclusively senior level persons for 
crimes committed in the third war in the former Yugoslavia: nine Serbian and Yugoslavian 
leaders and six high level commanders of the Albanian KLA.219 Among the high ranking 
officials were the Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian President Milan 
Milutinović and several Serbian ministers and generals of the Yugoslavian army.220  
Until 1999, war had remained at a distance for the majority of the Serbs in Serbia. But 
NATO bombing of strategic targets in Serbia made the war suddenly very close and very real. 
The only way the people of Serbia understood the war was by state supported media. The 
Serbian state-controlled media reported only acts of violence committed against the Serbs. 
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And so the people of Serbia identified with Serbia’s authoritarian president Slobodan 
Milošević and were united in their opposition to the ICTY. 
Conclusion chapter 2 
The majority of all ethnical populations were in denial about their past and the conduct of 
their forces during the armed conflict. The Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks viewed themselves 
mostly as victims and not as perpetrators of aggression and atrocities against the other parties. 
Hence local courts indicted and prosecuted war criminals only of the ethnic rival group(s).  
As the Tribunal had no enforcement agencies at its disposal, the court was entirely 
reliant upon the cooperation of states. The cooperation of the states of the former Yugoslavia 
depended upon the local leaders who often possessed senior authority during the war. As 
ethnic cleansing and the other war crimes appeared to be part of an organized policy by the 
warring factions of the former Yugoslavia, it did not appear likely that the politicians of these 
states would arrest the executioners of their own policies.  
Without consent of the local leaders that controlled most of the Balkan media, the 
work of the Tribunal could not reach its intended beneficiaries: the peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia. Nationalistic, xenophobic and often paranoid local leaders opposed the primacy 
and even the existence of the ICTY. Thus, the ICTY became increasingly obstructed by this 
refusal to cooperate. 
There existed a sharp distinction between the states that recognized their duty to 
cooperate with the ICTY, and those that did not. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia fell into the 
first category, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the 
Bosnian-Serb entity within the state Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, fell into the 
second. Yugoslavia’s total refusal to cooperate with the ICTY and the war crimes committed 
in the Serbian province Kosovo culminated at the end of the nineties in the indictment of the 
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević. By then Serbia, Montenegro and Republika 
Srpska had each become a safe haven for (ethnic Serbian) ICTY indictees. 
To legitimize their attitude against cooperation with the ICTY, the local leaders used 
propaganda through the state supported media. During the nineties, many leaders of the states 
of the former Yugoslavia used the media to discredit the ICTY. The wide misunderstandings 
of the ICTY appeared within the region because nationalist politicians had assimilated the 
ICTY within their own mythologized versions of the past. Local perceptions of the Tribunal 
were to a large extent based upon local media: the local media portrayed the court and its 
accused as controversial (while reporting little or nothing about the war crimes). At the end of 
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the nineties many peoples in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Serbia, believed that the 
court for the former Yugoslavia was an illegitimate and biased court. 
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The Tribunal is founded on fine principles but in practice how can it actually 
render the justice that victims want and deserve? We are in The Hague, the 
affected communities are in the former Yugoslavia. The process must remain 
relevant to the people affected by the conflict. It is critical that they are informed 
about the Tribunal and its activities and have the opportunity to apply its work to 
their own communities. 
Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald221 
 
[…] there was a strong perception that the Tribunal was shrouded in mystery, 
depersonalized, distant and unresponsive; too narrow in its focus; and too 
legalistic in its outlook. 
Judge Vohrah222 
 
Chapter 3 The ICTY 1999-2009 
By 1999 the ICTY was finally working at full juridical capacity. Nevertheless, the 
work of the ICTY was not viewed favourably by its constituency: the people of the former 
Yugoslavia. Although the peoples from the former Yugoslavia were crucial for the fulfilment 
of the mandate of the Tribunal, it appeared that these people were until 1999 largely 
‘forgotten’. The then President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald recognised this when she said: 
 
“I realised that there was a need – a necessity, really – for the Tribunal to do 
more: to actually communicate with the people of the former Yugoslavia, 
living hundreds of miles away from the Tribunal that had been established for 
their benefit.”223  
 
To this end, the Tribunal’s President McDonald ordered in September 1999 the launch of an 
‘Outreach program’.224 The time appeared right: While the ICTY launched Outreach and its 
own public information campaign in late 1999, Croatia and Serbia respectively in 1999 and 
2000 each got rid of its nationalistic regime and its all-persuasive propaganda machinery.  
 
After six years, our judicial infrastructure is complete and is functioning. We 
are now able to disseminate our work to its principal beneficiaries, to explain 
what we are doing and why. 
Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald225 
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“Although a public relations capacity has existed since very early in its 
creation, the courts primary constituency – the population of the former 
Yugoslavia – was typically not its principal focus. […] Whilst interested 
individuals in other parts of Europe and in America could obtain copies of 
ICTY documents, those in the former Yugoslavia were left wondering “what The 
Hague is doing”.” 
Judge Vohrah226 
ICTY: Reaching out to the region; the ICTY “Outreach” program 
When the Outreach program was launched in September 1999, the Tribunal finally 
had a section entirely devoted to (communication with) the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. 
The intention of the Outreach programme was to make the ICTY better accessible and more 
understandable to the peoples in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, with the launch 
of the Outreach programme, the region of the former Yugoslavia became (again) at the centre 
of the ICTY’s work.  
Since the ICTY had no press officers for the various states of the region, it was 
decided that the employees of the Outreach programme would speak on behalf of the 
Tribunal. To represent the ICTY effectively throughout the region, the Outreach program 
would have several offices throughout the former Yugoslavia. The office in The Hague would 
function as the headquarters and would coordinate the communicative activities. The several 
regional dependencies throughout the region would organise local outreach activities and 
would function as the point of contact between the ICTY and the peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia.227 
In due course the Outreach program was established in four capitals in the region: in 
Sarajevo (early 2000),228 in Zagreb, in Priština (January 2001) and in Belgrade (April 
2001).229 These regional offices intended to provide information about the ICTY directly to 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. The initial strategy was that the regional offices of 
Outreach would engage the people at the local level. The regional Outreach offices thus 
would act as: 
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“centres of information to an extremely broad range of actors, such as 
journalists, lawyers, victims, judges, academic institutions, think tanks, and the 
general public”.230 
 
The Outreach program formulated a strategy to communicate to certain groups within 
the societies of the region, such as local judicial professionals and local media, so that they  
could function as intermediaries between the ICTY and the peoples of the region.231 President 
McDonald posited that these groups would be best placed to act as information liaisons to 
explain the Tribunal’s role.232 
The programme finally commenced in September 1999. The Outreach programme 
operated in the languages of the region: initially only the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian 
(BCS) and later also in the Albanian and Macedonian languages.233 The employees of 
Outreach would translate and explain the rules and procedures of the court, making the ICTY 
more transparent for the peoples of the region. The Outreach concept presumed that if those in 
the legal sector of the former Yugoslavia knew how the court worked, misconceptions of all 
the people in the region would be challenged. It was intended that the local people in the legal 
sector would act as mediator between the ICTY and the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.  
The new section would also be responsible for making the Tribunal better accessable to 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. For this, the Outreach section started to organize and 
facilitate visits to the ICTY in The Hague.  Outreach would attempt to make the ICTY more 
transparent, more  accessible and better understandable to the communities in the region.234 
According to Outreach coordinator Liam McDowell the mandate of Outreach was: 
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“to explain to all those in the Balkans who want to hear it that the Tribunal is 
neither an abstract document nor an organ charged for organizing vengeance, but 
an instrument with a role in the reestablishment of the rule of law and which 
contributes to the reconciliation, and thus in the end to peace and stability. […] 
The objective […] is for people to at last acknowledge that the ICTY is theirs, 
even if it is geographically in The Hague.235  
 
The new section of the ICTY stumbled after its launch upon the same problems as the 
Tribunal itself had done six years before: it needed funds. The Outreach program was a 
United Nations Trust Fund and was therefore entirely funded by voluntary contributions.236 
The 2000 Annual ICTY Report refers to the Outreach programme as becoming part of the 
main budget of 2001, but the 2001 Annual ICTY Report states that it would "be part of the 
main Tribunal budget for the period 2002/2003" and the 2002 Annual Report does not 
mention Outreach becoming part of the regular budget at all. The section thus never received 
funding from the United Nations.  
The UN did not fund the program from the Tribunal’s regular budget, but it did assist 
the new section, through various means. Certain regular budget posts at ICTY headquarters in 
the Hague were allocated to Outreach-related functions, such as web support, security, and 
translation. To reduce logistical and security costs, the regional Outreach offices used the 
existing capacity of UN missions (and, presumably, existing ICTY OTP offices) in the 
region.237 But despite this assistance, the Outreach programme needed funds. President 
McDonald repeatedly urged United Nations member states to support Outreach in 
contributions.238 The president referred to Outreach as a “vital project” in the contribution to 
reconciliation in the region, but the section remained completely dependent on voluntary 
contributions.239 And so the section became, immediately after its launch, under-financed. 
The financial difficulties made the work of the Outreach program more problematic. 
Many positions at the office could not be filled and the program became understaffed. Of the 
1,200 persons working for ICTY in The Hague, only two worked for the Outreach section.240 
In each regional office, only two persons could be employed with one functioning as an 
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assistant dealing with administrative matters.241 Moreover, the regional offices experienced 
recruitment problems because of the relatively difficult criteria of the position: employees 
working for the local Outreach office needed to speak the language(s) of the region, needed to 
have essential knowledge of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as well as knowledge of 
the cases at the ICTY.242 The Tribunal could not hire a person that could officially speak on 
behalf of the ICTY in the local languages until the year 2000.243 The lack of funds of the 
Outreach program caused understaffed offices in The Hague and in the region while the 
existing staff used much valuable time to acquire financial sponsors for Outreach activities.244  
The Outreach section became increasingly dependent upon cooperation with NGO’s. 
The NGO’s had the necessary funds and staff which ICTY Outreach lacked. Many outreach-
related activities were organized by external NGO’s and most of the activities of Outreach 
were funded by these NGO’s.245 Local NGO’s organised and funded seminars, roundtables 
and symposiums about the ICTY and often invited Outreach representatives to visit and 
speak.  
NGO’s with similar objectives as the Outreach programme, gained more tangible 
results in communicating the work of the ICTY to the people of former Yugoslavia than 
Outreach itself.246 It was clear that the work of Outreach was heavily supplemented by this 
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level of cooperation.  The independent news agency SENSE,247 for example, continuously 
publicised news reports about the ICTY throughout the former Yugoslavia. In March 2000 
SENSE launched a weekly 15-minute television programme named “The Tribunal” about the 
ICTY.248 The program broadcasted in the local languages every week some coverage of the 
ICTY courtroom proceedings.249 In addition to daily reports and weekly TV programs, 
SENSE agency later produced six documentary films that reached an even greater 
audience.250 
Another NGO that performed a large component of the Outreach mandate was the US 
based Court TV, which used audiovisual transmissions from the ICTY to broadcast the Tadić 
trial in parts to the former Yugoslavia.251 When Outreach was launched in 1999, the program 
immediately made trial proceedings easily available. The availability of live audio and visual 
broadcast of court proceedings was used by television and radio broadcast media throughout 
the region. This enabled NGO´s to establish online archives of proceedings in particular 
trials.252 Whenever a courtroom was “ín action” the live audio broadcast was transmitted on 
the internet and consequently was available to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. This 
service became especially popular throughout the former Yugoslavia when the former 
president Slobodan Milošević appeared before the Trial Chamber of the ICTY.253 The 
Outreach programme carried out its mandate in large part due to cooperation with and funding 
by NGO’s, and the Outreach program rarely organised and funded activities on its own. In 
                                                                                                                                                   
distributed these and other information about the ICTY throughout the region. The CIJ thus became a key source 
for human rights groups and legal associations within Yugoslavia. When the Outreach program was launched it 
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250
 The six documentary films are entitled: “Triumph of Evil, about the Srebrenica genocide trial” (2001), 
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and “Rise and Fall of General Mladic” (2005). All available at http://www.sense-
agency.com/en/multimedia/index.php?mulkat=2, viewed 10 June 2009, 19:30. 
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 This broadcast initially received high viewing figures but these figures soon dropped when the trial became 
more technical, and the program was suspended due to lack of funding. See Vorah, “The Outreach Programme”, 
552. 
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 ICTY, “Outreach Programme. Proposal for Contributions to the UN Voluntary Fund for the continued 
operation in 2003 of the ICTY Outreach Programme”, 8. 
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The two tv-stations were Federation Television (FTV) and Republika Srpska Television. See "ICTY Outreach 
Activities - 2003", at: http://www.icty.org/sid/10114 and see the ICTY press release of 15 February 2002, 
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release of 29 June 2001, "Slobodan Milosevic transferred into Custody of the International Criminal tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia.", at: http://www.icty.org/sid/7978, viewed 8 June 2009, 18:00. 
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2000, for example, Outreach organized 4 activities out of its own budget, with the other 13 
activities that year being organized and funded by external NGO’s.254 One Outreach activity 
was a seminar in the Croatian capital Zagreb for 45 Croatian attorneys where the legal 
professionals were informed about the various possibilities for employment at one of the 
ICTY-Defense teams.255 Another Outreach activity was a two-day visit of three ICTY judges 
to Zagreb where the ICTY judges met with representatives of Croatian legal institutions and 
organizations. Remarkably, this was the first visit of ICTY-Judges to Croatia in the seven 
years since Tribunal existed.256 Outreach organized another working visit of ICTY 
representatives, this time to Sarajevo, and the Outreach program produced a video entitled 
“Justice at Work” which Outreach employees showed during subsequent presentations.257 
Although these Outreach activities appeared successful in their own means, there was a big 
contrast between the participants of these small, focused activities and the 18.3 million people 
that made up the general population of the region.258 The small group visits were often 
explaining the workings of the Tribunal to legal professionals and students, and the Outreach 
activities did result in relationships with the legal communities of the region. But the number 
of people reached overall was in the hundreds and the activities were relatively few: In 2000 
there were 17 outreach-related activities spread out over the states of the region and The 
Hague and largely funded and organized externally.  
Activities increased in 2001, when the Outreach program organized together with 
external NGO’s 75 outreach-related activities, of which ten activities were funded by its own 
budget. This represented an increase in activities of almost fourfold. However, these activities 
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were also of the small, focused group nature, with visits by judges and the ICTY Registrar to 
the region, workshops with local lawyers in Belgrade, meetings with victims groups, and the 
first seminar in Kosovo. These activities were successful in their own limited way, but did not 
produce the necessary sizeable effect on the perceptions of the peoples of the region. The 
message, well transmitted to the small groups that received it, had not yet trickled down. Yet 
Outreach continued with this strategy. 
Outreach 
activities 
Visit to the ICTY 
in The Hague 
ICTY reps to the 
region 
Local Outreach 
activities 
Total activities 
1999 2 0 0 2 
2000 4 2 11 17 
2001  11 6 58 75 
2002  14 1 47 62 
2003  19 1 30 50 
In 2002, the level of activity decreased slightly from the prior year, with  14 visits to 
the ICTY in The Hague, 1 from ICTY representatives to the region, and 47 activities 
organised by the local regional outreach offices. In 2003, the level of activity decreased 
further: from a modest 62 in 2002, down to 50 total activities in 2003.259  
Despite its initial problems, the Outreach program did experience some successes. 
Relatively easy to organise (but very essential for the distribution of information) was the 
translation of official ICTY documents. The Outreach Programme provided (finally) ICTY 
documents and press releases in the local languages available to the public. These documents 
included indictments, judgments, decisions and orders, as well as all basic legal documents 
such as the Statute of the Tribunal, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Rules governing 
defence and detention matters.  
These documents were made available on the website of the ICTY, and in hard copies 
and on CD-roms in The Hague and in the regional Outreach offices. Outreach created a BCS 
sub-website for the Tribunal; a translation of the website of the ICTY into the local 
languages.260 Web-broadcasts of trials and the information-sheets about the cases were 
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 To keep these figures in context: when Outreach organises the Office of the Prosecutor to speak for an hour in 
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 The 2003 Annual Report of the ICTY noted that “the pages in B/C/S and Albanian generated by the Outreach 
programme have been frequently visited.” See S/2003/829, 59. It should be noted however that the Albanian 
website was launched only in 2003. 
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popular.261 Outreach made public court sessions of the previous years accessible on the 
internet, and sent documentation about the ICTY to libraries and other educative institutions 
throughout the region.262 
Although Outreach had few resources and was lacking employees, the program 
attempted to initiate a public information campaign about the ICTY throughout the region. 
Sometimes the local media were more than willing to broadcast Outreach activities. For 
example, when Outreach coordinated a visit of the Registrar of the Tribunal, Hans Holthuis, 
to Belgrade to meet with the state officials, the visit received “considerable attention” in the 
media.263 Often, however, the activities organised by Outreach for the general public in the 
region had a low turnout.264 The population in the region was often too hostile to attend the 
presentations.265 
Some of the events organised by Outreach were broadcast throughout the region. For 
example, the series “The Hague Live” broadcast by the Serbian channel B92 on 14 May 2002 
in which ICTY and Serbians simultaneously were on the air and had a live discussion. But a 
much greater audience was reached through the efforts of SFOR, which filmed a documentary 
about the ICTY entitled “Justice for All”.266 Two state television stations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina broadcast the SFOR documentary, watched by 45 per cent of the population 
aged between 20 and 45 (about 41 per cent of the total population). The broadcast was 
preceded by a campaign in the local media with billboards and posters to inform people. The 
documentary was both informative and useful in dismissing some misperceptions, and was 
rebroadcast by several local TV stations in January 2003.267 
One accomplishment of Outreach was the establishment of a broad network of 
contacts with local NGO’s, government officials, victims’ groups and educational 
institutions.268 This would prove to be valuable in the execution of Outreach’s changing 
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Programme. Proposal for Contributions to the UN Voluntary Fund for the continued operation in 2003 of the 
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mandate. Outreach representatives were also involved with the communication between the 
ICTY and members of the international community (instead of exclusively the peoples of the 
region). While the efforts of the Outreach program were confined because of financial 
difficulties, the section did not limit itself to the former Yugoslavia.269 However, the majority 
of outreach-related activities organised were limited in their reach. Visits from the people of 
the former Yugoslavia to The Hague involved very small groups.270  Accordingly, the local 
media were not enthusiastic to broadcast these activities. Moreover, the membership of the 
groups was often limited. The Outreach program concentrated predominantly on law-students, 
legal professionals, media and politicians from the region. The program thus rarely reached 
the general public of the region. 
Outreach’s expanded mandate 
Where once the Security Council was pushing the ICTY for indictments, for results 
and therefore relevance, now that these results had largely been achieved, the Security 
Council was pushing the ICTY to close down. The Security Council instructed the OTP to 
end the issuance of indictments in 2004 and ordered the ICTY to transfer some (minor and 
intermediate) cases to national jurisdictions and requested the ICTY to increase its activities 
                                                                                                                                                   
ICTY Outreach Programme”, 6. However, it should be noted that  there is a large gap between the Outreach 
mandate, its published efforts, and its actual accomplishments. The number of activities published is 
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countries plus The Hague, over approximately 18.3 million people. See CIA “The World Factbook””, at supra 
258 and both charts with outreach activities, Annex 1; Table Outreach Activities 1999-2009; Table Outreach 
activities in the former Yugoslavia. 
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expenses. Although the experience of a visit at the ICTY could makes more difference in creating a realistic and 
accurate view of the work at the ICTY, were these visits expensive, were difficult to organise and reached only a 
small audience. 
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in the strengthening of judicial systems in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.271 The 
Outreach section already had contacts with some professionals of the local courts, and had 
focused much of its time and resources towards cooperation with and instruction of local 
judiciaries. The Security Council therefore determined to incorporate the Outreach program in 
implementation of the Tribunal's Completion Strategy.272 
 Although the United Nations did not provide for a budget for the Outreach program, it 
did provide for a bigger and shifting mandate. Outreach, in becoming part of the Completion 
Strategy and facilitating the transfer of expertise and cases to the region, was moving further 
and further away from its stated purpose: to inform the people of the former Yugoslavia about 
the work and achievements of the Tribunal. As part of the effort to strengthen judicial systems 
in the region, the ICTY and the international community contributed to the establishment of 
specialised organs for war crimes investigations and proceedings in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia and Croatia. 
Because of its prior experience and networks, the Outreach program was called upon 
to further develop the national judicial potential. The program thus started to play an 
increasingly important function in the Completion Strategy of the ICTY. The 2005 Annual 
Report of the ICTY noted even that the Outreach Programme:  
 
“primarily focused on transferring knowledge and best practices to the judiciaries 
of States of the former Yugoslavia.” (italics added).273  
 
The difficult financial position of the Outreach program improved in 2004, when the 
program became entirely supported by the European Commission.274 In February 2005, an 
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internal reorganization of the ICTY changed the functioning of the  program. The Public 
Information Services Section and the Outreach Programme merged into a new 
Communications Service of the Tribunal. The Communication Service was divided into two 
separate sections: “media, outreach and website” and “ICTY publications, ICTY tribunet (the 
internal internet portal for ICTY employees) and ICTY visits”.275 
As the mandate of Outreach expanded, the functions of the section also increased. Part 
of its mandate was to include monitoring the developments of the local and regional courts of 
the former Yugoslavia, and tracking developments and reforms in domestic criminal justice 
systems, and war crimes cases conducted by national authorities in the region. 
In Croatia, the Outreach programme assisted training seminars for judges and 
prosecutors of local war crimes cases. In 2004, Outreach organised training seminars to share 
expertise and information with the Croatian authorities, for eventual referral of cases from the 
Tribunal.276 Outreach worked with these local courts to facilitate their establishment but 
mostly to facilitate the transfer of cases in service of the Completion Strategy. 
Local courts in the region began to establish their own specialised courts for dealing 
with war crimes.277 In late 2003, the Belgrade District Court established a Department of War 
Crimes.278 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a national War Crimes Chamber (“WCC”) was established 
to try the most sensitive war crimes cases, including several ICTY referred cases.279 The 
WCC was fully operational by January of 2005.280 
Between 2005 and 2007, eight cases involving 13 indictees were ordered by a special 
chamber of the ICTY to be referred to local authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Serbia. Ten accused were transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial before the WCC, 
two accused were transferred to the authorities of Croatia for trial before the Zagreb County 
Court, and one accused was transferred to Serbia for trial before the Belgrade District 
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Court.281 Up to early 2009, the ICTY Outreach programme continued to assist the 
development of a public information and outreach-strategy of the WCC as the court desired to 
involve the general public more in the effort to deal with war crimes.282 However, the 
Outreach programme itself did not appear to share this agenda. The transfer of cases and 
expertise continued to absorb the large part of Outreach resources.  
“Bridging the gap” 
As victims´ groups demanded more attention, the Outreach program began to address 
this crucial part of its focus. The victims association “Mothers of Srebrenica and Žepa 
Enclaves” reacted harshly to the deal that the OTP made with the accused Momir Nikolić and 
in May 2003 the Outreach program initiated discussion with this NGO.283 The ICTY had by 
then seventeen accused persons that had pleaded guilty before the courts of the Tribunal but 
had not disseminated these statements of guilt throughout the region.284 It became apparent 
that more interaction was necessary “to narrow the gap” of information between the ICTY 
and the victims of the conflict. To narrow this gap, Outreach began a series of conferences 
titled “Bridging the Gap”.285 
This small effort by Outreach at engagement of victims throughout the region was 
more in line with the original mandate of the programme. During the conference, senior ICTY 
officials described what they had done in the relevant cases. The ICTY employees showed the 
evidence presented during trials, as well as the facts established during the trials and 
explained factors considered in determining the sentences. These “Bridging the Gap”-
conferences were held throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially in the communities that 
were most affected by the crimes that fell under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. While the 
Outreach programme had neglected these communities, the courts of the ICTY had revealed 
much of what had happened during the wars of the former Yugoslavia. In 2004, eleven years 
after the Tribunal had been established, and five years after the launch of the Outreach 
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program, did Outreach explain the Tribunal’s work to the victims and the ordinary citizens of 
the former Yugoslavia.   
The Outreach programme announced the Bridging the Gap conferences in December 
2003.286 These one-day conferences began in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  ICTY staff held talks in 
places where some of the most notorious crimes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction had been 
committed: Brčko, Foča, Konjic, Prijedor and Srebrenica. Some conferences later were 
repeated in Republika Srpska and elsewhere in the region. As of July 2009, eleven Bridging 
the Gap conferences had been held throughout the former Yugoslavia. 
 While the Outreach programme continued its regular activities and the several one-day 
Bridging the Gap conferences, most of the focus was on continued relationships with the local 
judiciaries.287   From autumn 2005 to autumn 2007 Outreach contributed a number of articles 
to the bi-monthly journal titled “Justice in Transition” which was published by the Serbian 
War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office. The journal was distributed to members of the Serbian 
judiciary, government representatives, NGO’s, international organisations and the diplomatic 
community.288 
 The employees of the Outreach programme made appearances on local television 
programs explaining the workings of the court.289 Sponsored by the Belgrade-based NGO 
Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Outreach selected during 2008 ten students from Belgrade 
to work for six months as interns across various sections of the ICTY.290 After the internship 
at the ICTY, the Serbian interns would serve an additional internship at the WCC in Belgrade. 
Although the ICTY had for many years of its existence almost a hundred interns during each 
month, these interns were the first from the former Yugoslavia.291 
Outreach 
activities 
Visit to the ICTY 
in The Hague 
ICTY reps to the 
region 
Local Outreach 
activities 
Total activities 
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2004 10 3 38 51 
2005 14 3 66292 83 
2006  10 2 31 43 
2007 293 15 5 61 81 
2008 * 9 0 18 27 
2009** 8 0 13 21 
* Due to unavailability, not all figures could be inserted in the 2008 row of the chart.  
** This chart dates till 20 June 2009: therefore the figures of 2009 are till June 2009. 
 
These efforts, more focused on the victims and general populations of the region, enjoyed 
some success. However, misperceptions had been allowed to fester among these groups for 
over a decade, with those in the region believing that the Tribunal was a biased institution that 
prosecuted selectively. 
Conclusion chapter 3 
During its first years of existence, the Outreach program predominantly communicated with 
local legal professionals. There was no initial plan for a widespread program of outreach to 
the general population of the former Yugoslavia. The Outreach program relied on the local 
legal professional as points of contact for disseminating the message throughout the region.  
This initial strategic decision, though successful in its own aims, would have far reaching 
consequences on the perceptions of the ICTY of the majority of those located in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
The distance of the Tribunal in The Hague from its war-torn origins made the 
international court lose cultural resonance. Many employees of ICTY were not from the 
region and many more did not understand the conflict or speak the language. At the same 
time, the attitude of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia was, by and large, still dictated by 
the local political powers and the media they controlled. The Outreach program was launched 
to improve the image and significance of the ICTY in its region.  
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However, in achieving these aims, the Outreach section initially narrowed its focus to 
a select number of activities with small groups of legal professionals. While this strategy 
would prove to be very beneficial to the eventual expansion of the Outreach mandate to 
include transferring knowledge and cases to the region in line with the Tribunal’s Completion 
Strategy, it missed the one group that the Tribunal was created to benefit, and the one group 
that Outreach was established to reach: the citizens of the region, many of whom were 
victims. Outreach activities became more focused on juridical cooperation and education with 
its incorporation into the Completion Strategy, and it wasn’t until 2004 that Outreach began a 
program focused on victims and the general population. Considering that the ICTY had been 
established to achieve justice for the victims, it seems scandalous that these groups were not 
considered a focus of Outreach until they themselves began to stir controversy and demanded 
to be heard over ten years after the Tribunal was founded.294 
Although the Outreach programme was seen by the Tribunal as one of its core 
activities, the section was not provided for by the United Nations in the Tribunal’s budget. 
The European Commission had funded the program since 2004 by contributions estimated ad 
one million euros per year. Rather than acting as a funding supplement, to increase the scope 
and audience of outreach activities, this has become the sole source of Outreach funding. 
The Outreach section has assisted in the establishment of national courts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia specialized in the prosecution of war crimes, but this is 
arguably outside of the Outreach mandate. Outreach representatives on the ground in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia participated in a variety of public events, communicating 
directly with the most affected communities, legal professionals, public officials, and civil 
society leaders in order to counter myths and misperceptions about the Tribunal and its 
proceedings and to disseminate facts about the Tribunal’s achievements and its contribution to 
the reconciliation of the former Yugoslavia.  However, it is debatable whether the relatively 
small number of Outreach activities that are truly focused on the victims and citizens of the 
region have been effective in changing long-standing misperceptions that were used as a 
nationalistic weapon in the waning days of the conflict. 
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law, “IHL”), (ii) establishing the facts, (iii) to render justice to the victims, (iv) to develop international law (v) 
to deter further crimes, and to contribute to the restoration of peace (by trying p) (emphasis added). See also 
"bringing justice to the former Yugoslavia. The tribunal’s core achievements", at: http://www.un.org/icty/cases-
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Chapter 4 An assessment of Outreach 
Perceptions in the Region 
Despite the accomplishments of the ICTY, the opinion of the people of the region of the 
ICTY is dismally low. This is partially a result of years of propaganda by state controlled 
media. The popularity of the ICTY is inversely proportionate to the number accused that 
came from the countries and particularly the ethnic communities concerned.295 According to a 
study in late 2001 and early 2002 the ICTY enjoyed strongest support in the region among the 
Kosovo Albanians – as much as 83.3 percent.296 According to a 2002 survey the opinion of 
the Tribunal was quite high in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and quite low in 
Republika Srpska where only 3.6 percent of the population had a positive opinion of the 
ICTY. The reputation of the ICTY in Serbia was little better (only 7.6 percent favourable) 
while 21 percent of the people of Croatia had a positive view of the ICTY.297 The local 
political powers used their propaganda instruments to influence the dominant ethnic group in 
their country against the ICTY, so the ethnic minorities were usually positive about the ICTY: 
the Muslims in Republika Srpska; the Hungarians and the Muslims in Serbia; the Serbs in 
Croatia and the Muslims in Montenegro.298  
 The political and military elite that ruled Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia were 
often themselves suspected of involvement in the investigated war crimes. The regimes in 
these countries did all they could to convince their citizens that the ICTY was biased and 
hostile towards their states and their ethic groups. The political and military elites used the 
same method as during the war nationalistic, extreme-dogmatic, hate-inciting propaganda. 
Therefore, the ICTY continued to have a poor public perception. With help of the local media, 
the local elite continued to distort and manipulate the message of the Tribunal. Media and 
public figures were usually hostile towards the Tribunal.  
In the region, the general public felt usually most connected with the accused of their 
ethnicity: as every ethnic community perceived its own members as the victim of aggression 
of war crimes, Bosniaks of Bosnia-Herzegovina supported “their” Naser Orić, Croatians 
supported “their” accused Ante Gotovina, Albanians supported “their” Haradinaj, and even 
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during the trial of Slobodan Milošević, Serbs aligned again with their former president. The 
ICTY accused were perceived as “heroes” by members of their own ethnic community and 
most ethnic communities in the former Yugoslavia are still in denial about the war crimes.299 
The perception of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia has not improved significantly 
since the launch of the Outreach program. According to a 2004 survey of the Belgrade Centre 
for Human Rights the majority of the polled Serbian citizens were not familiar with the ICTY 
as an institution. 300 As a matter of fact, the public view of the ICTY became instead more 
negative.301 According to a survey the NGO published in 2007 only 7% of the polled Serbian 
citizens believed that the ICTY was unbiased while 63% believed that “too many” Serbs were 
accused compared to other ethnic groups.302 Moreover, trials against ethic Serbs are widely 
believed to be unfair, and their sentences are considered much harsher than those of accused 
with other ethic backgrounds.303 In other countries of the former Yugoslavia, media 
broadcasts and public figures are also hostile towards the ICTY.304 
The failure of Outreach 
Currently the ICTY is in its sixteenth year of existence. The Tribunal is estimated to 
conclude all but three of its trials in 2010.305 Year after year surveys show that the number 
ready to testify in war crime trials before the ICTY or national courts are diminishing.306 The 
journalist Mirko Klarin reported in June 2009 that: 
 
“Regular polls in Serbia over the past four years have shown that the public 
view of the ICTY has constantly been negative; if anything, it has 
deteriorated.”307 
 
According to a 2007 survey of the Belgrade Center for Human Rights only 7% of the 
polled believed that the ICTY was unbiased when it tried Serbs. As many as 63% believed 
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that there were “too many” Serb indictees (compared with other ethnic groups). The ICTY is 
currently more unpopular than when the Outreach program was launched ten years ago. In 
Serbia, for example, the majority believes that the ICTY is a greater danger to the national 
security than NATO (which was responsible for the bombing campaign against Serbia in 
1999).308 There have been no recent surveys in the other former Yugoslavian countries but: 
 
“statements by public figures and comments in the media are hostile and 
increasingly derogatory, contemptuous and disparaging towards the ICTY in 
general, and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in particular.”309 
 
Clearly the perception of the ICTY in the region has deteriorated. Given that the 
Outreach program has been a priority within the ICTY since 1999,310 why is it then that after 
16 years, 161 indictments, concluded proceedings against 120 accused in 86 cases and more 
than 1,000 years of total prison sentences, the opinion of the ICTY throughout the former 
Yugoslavia is so low?  
First, Outreach was not in the minds of the ICTY organisers when they established the 
Tribunal, who had many other tasks to focus on. That the people, the victims and the language 
of the region were largely ignored was glaringly apparent. To be fair, how could they focus on 
getting publicity when there were no results to publicize?  
Second, after six years of existence Outreach was launched under financed. The 
Outreach program was established to get the message out and correct misperceptions in the 
region. But Outreach was established with no budget. 
Third, the Outreach program had a flawed strategy. The strategy of the program had a 
limited focus which did not address (and reach) the large potential audience in Yugoslavia. 
Instead the Outreach program favoured a small, focused audience of juridical backgrounds. 
The focus on local judiciary would prove useful in the later transfer of cases, mandated by the 
Security Council. But it would also lead to a change in Outreach focus further away from the 
people and victims. 
Fourth, the Outreach program was static and passive. Instead the program had to be 
more dynamic and more flexible. The program selected in 1999 upon a strategy to reach out 
to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Outreach continued the policy even when it appeared 
not to work very well. The Outreach program had to reach about 18.3 million persons, with 
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different religious backgrounds, living in seven different states, speaking even more local 
languages and with an often hostile regime and media. The program decided to connect with 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia by reaching out through persons acting as intermediaries 
between the ICTY and the former Yugoslavia.311 The trickle-down strategy did not work as 
expected, but nevertheless the program continued its (ineffective) efforts. The Bridging the 
Gap series of conferences is the only witness-focused, public-focused program, yet it 
represents a very small part of the Outreach activities.312 Most Outreach-related activities 
remained targeted at judicial and journalist intermediaries. 
Fifth, when the program finally changed its mandate, it abandoned its original focus: 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Because of its focus at local judiciaries, the mandate of 
the Outreach program changed. In time the Outreach mandate has shifted to Completion 
Strategy. The Outreach program facilitated local judiciaries in the establishment of specialised 
organs for war crimes investigations and proceedings in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Serbia. These Outreach activities were effective for helping the ICTY to close its doors, but 
not for getting the message out. Moreover, this shift in mandate diverted necessary funds from 
disseminating the ICTY achievements to the transfer of cases and knowledge for its 
completion.  
 Sixth, the activities of the program never increased to the necessary extent. Initially 
this delay was caused by the insufficient funds. However, once EU funding was in place, 
Outreach operated with a budget that can be estimated at approximately one million euros per 
year.313 With this funding, much could have been and should have been accomplished. The 
total number of Outreach activities launched by the program is for every year approximately 
fifty, which would be about one Outreach activity per week.314 To reach 18,3 million people 
throughout four countries, speaking different languages with merely one speech, lecture, 
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roundtable, conference, visit, or meeting a week would be impossible. The activities never 
increased to the necessary extent. 
It should be noted that the reports of the program are vague. It is unclear how the 
program spent its funds. It is also unclear on what activities the collected funds were spent. It 
is remarkable that the Outreach section – which had to make the ICTY more transparent, 
more accessible and better understandable - is unclear about its own expenses. Moreover, it 
appears that the registration of activities have been inflated by activities of other departments 
such as the OTP and external NGO’s. Outreach organised or funded few of the reported 
activities. 
Sixth, the employees at the Outreach section had little cultural resonance with the 
region. The Outreach staff were, as ICTY staff, recruited from all over the world. Although it 
is understandable that some ICTY organs, such as the OTP, were wary of recruiting people of 
the region, is it not understandable that the Outreach section had such anxieties. The section 
dealing entirely with the former Yugoslavia, should have been constituted mainly of people 
from this area. All staff of the Outreach program should be able to communicate in the 
languages of the region. 
Seventh, the execution of the Outreach activities were irregular and disproportionate. 
Serbia received at any time almost half of all the Outreach related activities -  the activities 
were unevenly divided amongst the states of the former Yugoslavia.315 The activities were 
unequally distributed throughout the region and the activities were also irregular throughout 
time: in 2004 the program conducted 10 activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina where in 2005 it 
conducted 31 activities.316 The Outreach section had two staff members for every state of the 
region and a small headquarters in The Hague. Funded by approximately a million euros per 
year and staffed with approximately like ten staff members, the Outreach program should 
have increased its activities and distributed them more equally across the region.317 
Eighth, the Outreach program did not assess the results of its activities. Like ICTY had 
done up to 1999, it seems that the Outreach program expected its work to speak for itself. 
After the translation of several key documents such as the Statute of the Tribunal, the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, the Key Figures and an ICTY leaflet into the languages of the 
region, the Outreach section assumed that spreading these documents would explain the 
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workings of the ICTY.318 However, these documents, such as the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure, were too legalistic and the other documents, such as the ICTY leaflet, were 
designed more for tourists visiting the Tribunal.319  
Nine, Outreach neglected the digital channel of communication. Instead, the program 
focused on more traditional techniques of communication. For the most part of its existence, 
Outreach did not have a meaningful web presence.320 The website was both in English and in 
only one language of the region. The layout of the web page was not understandable nor was 
it transparent: it consisted of one page (no tabs nor any links) where all the activities of the 
section since its inception in September 1999 were listed in a calendar. Only when the ICTY 
launched its improved website in December 2008 did the Outreach section have a complete 
web presence with information about the workings of the ICTY.321 
Ten, too much attention of the Outreach program was directed at the dissemination of 
basic legal documents such as the ICTY key figures. Documents, such as the Statute of the 
ICTY, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the key figures contain much valuable 
information but they do not explain the workings of the Tribunal. Outreach should have 
presented evidence of ICTY cases, instead of key figures. In the trial chambers of the ICTY 
certain facts were proven beyond reasonable doubt, which should have been communicated to 
the peoples of the region.322 ICTY judges have heard testimonies of eyewitnesses, survivors 
and perpetrators which should have been distributed throughout the region. Forensic data and 
documentary and video evidence should have been easily accessible for the peoples of the 
former Yugoslavia. Outreach should have proactively distributed the evidence which was 
showed during ICTY trials. 
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What Could Outreach Have Done Better? 
When the ICTY was established Outreach was neglected. In 1999, the Outreach 
program got launched with a misguided strategy. While the program should have abandoned 
the strategy, it continued. The program got undermined by lack of substantial activities. 
Initially, the program got underfunded. Later, the program received nearly a million euros a 
year. The people of the region and the international community could and should expect 
more.  
The Outreach program had a difficult mandate: the section had to make ICTY trials 
understandable to audiences of all ethnic communities in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, while the ICTY trials were difficult to understand even for the local legal 
professionals. However after ten years of Outreach activities, some recommendations for the 
program can be made: 
First, a more comprehensive website should have been an early priority and it should 
have been launched in the local languages. The web is a powerful tool. Information can be 
spread and shared rapidly among a huge audience. The ICTY could have provided evidence, 
such as videotapes of mass killing online available for the general public of the region.323 The 
Outreach program claimed that victim protection and confidentiality prevented meaningful 
information sharing simply is not valid, if there is so much public information that has not 
been publicized or promoted. 
 Second, the ICTY should have mounted an aggressive campaign. The ICTY and the 
outreach program on its behalf, should be utilising all tools available to counter clear 
misstatements of fact about the cases put forth by the media and political leaders in the 
region. The Tribunal should (not be afraid to) go to the national courts of the region if local 
persons utter clear lies about the ICTY. All means possible should be used to counter the 
propaganda of the local media. Misstatements on the internet should be immediately 
contradicted.324 
Third, the Outreach program should have focused on explaining the evidence 
presented in court, the conflict and the events that took place to the general populations of the 
region, instead of focusing continually on small groups of juridical professionals and students 
who often already possessed an understanding of these issues. 
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Fourth, the Outreach program should have addressed victims groups proactively and 
sooner in its mandate, rather than waiting for these groups to vocally complain about being 
ignored. Better steps should have been taken to reach out to these groups, such as keeping 
good contacts after their contacts with the ICTY-Victims an Witnesses Section (“VWS”) and 
after the trial activity. 
Fifth, the ICTY should have focused more on what the court actually accomplishes, 
the work that is done on a day to day basis, instead of releasing rules, procedures, facts and 
figures. 
Sixth, while forming networks and alliances with local judiciaries, and assisting and 
facilitating the eventual transfer of cases is a necessary step, the substantive part of this 
process is not an outreach-related function, and should have been handled perhaps by a 
transition team, but certainly should have been funded from the ICTY regular budget, and not 
the limited funds of Outreach.  Moreover, if Outreach were to focus its message on larger 
groups of the general population, rather than small groups of lawyer and journalists, more 
people could be reached. 
Seventh, Outreach should have worked much more with the cooperative and 
knowledgeable local NGO’s. These NGO’s have proven willing to do the work for Outreach, 
but the limited number of activities Outreach facilitates each year, and the number of 
participants, must be increased if perceptions are to change. Together bigger and better 
programs could be coordinated.  
Eighth, the successful Bridging the Gap-conferences had many strong elements: 
evidence from court cases, a focus on people and victims, presentations by ICTY staff who 
could better explain the cases and evidence all made for a rich presentation.  However, these 
conferences were not conceived until 2004 and have only been held five times since then. 
Bridging the Gap is actually a model for what the entire Outreach program should have been; 
a series of conferences continually held and equally distributed throughout all parts of the 
former Yugoslavia.   
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Conclusion The ICTY and its region: a reserved relationship 
In this thesis I have examined why the ICTY has done so little to address and correct 
misperceptions of its achievements throughout the former Yugoslavia.  
Up to 1999, the ICTY has forgotten its constituents. In chapter one I described the 
difficulties the Tribunal experienced which caused it to neglect the peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia. The warfare hindered the work of the ICTY: witnesses could not be called, mass 
graves could not be examined, crime sites could not be examined, investigations could not be 
conducted and arrest warrants could not be executed. The ICTY received too little support 
from the international community, as important states like Great-Britain and France opposed a 
strong Tribunal. As a result, the UN was reluctant and ineffective in its support. Even the UN 
Security Council – the institution that founded the ICTY – did not strongly back the Tribunal. 
As a consequence, the ICTY received too little funds. Most Member States of the UN General 
Assembly initially did not ratify the Statute of the Tribunal.  
Because of numerous difficulties, the ICTY developed slowly into a workable 
institution. Judges were selected, the statute and rules for the court were adopted, employees 
were hired and courtrooms were built. After prosecutor Goldstone had formulated an 
indictment strategy, suspected war criminals started to be indicted by the ICTY. However, 
neither the states of the region nor the international peacekeeping force would execute the 
resulting arrest warrants.  
Only when prosecutor Arbour introduced secret indictments, did detainees begin to 
arrive at the UN detention unit in The Hague. More prison cells and additional courtrooms 
were built and more judges were appointed. International support for the ICTY increased 
significantly when the war in Kosovo escalated. At the end of the nineties, the ICTY had 
developed into a fully functioning juridical institution. Only then, with the launch of the 
Outreach program in September 1999, did the Tribunal started to address its constituents in 
the former Yugoslavia. 
In chapter two, the relationship of the region with the ICTY is more central. As local 
leaders often possessed senior authority (and responsibility) during the war, they opposed 
cooperation with the Tribunal. The local leaders used their state-supported media to 
manipulate their citizens. The peoples of the region were disorientated because of the 
widespread economic crisis and the war in the former Yugoslavia, and the official media 
capitalised on this by preaching nationalistic xenophobia. As the state-supported press was the 
sole source of information for most peoples, the hateful propaganda found fertile grounds. 
Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks each perceived themselves as victims and not perpetrators of 
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aggression and atrocities against the others. Increasingly, people of the region began believing 
in conspiracies and perceiving the ICTY as an ”executor” of these international conspiracies. 
Local leaders often found enough local support to hinder or obstruct the (primacy of) the 
ICTY.  
As the ICTY had no enforcement mechanism, the court was entirely reliant upon 
cooperation of states. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia recognised their duty to cooperate with 
the ICTY, but the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Republika 
Srpska refused to cooperate entirely. The war crimes committed in the Serbian province 
Kosovo culminated at the end of the nineties in the indictment of the Yugoslavian President 
Slobodan Milošević. By then Serbia, Montenegro and Republika Srpska had each become a 
safe haven for (ethnic Serbian) ICTY indictees. It was clear that without assistance of the 
local leaders the work of the ICTY could not reach its intended beneficiaries: the peoples of 
the former Yugoslavia.  
Chapter three, “The ICTY 1999-2009”, examines the launch of the Outreach program 
and its activities between 1999-2009 throughout the former Yugoslavia. The program was 
launched in September 1999, to actively “reach out” to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. 
The intention behind the Outreach program was that the region of the former Yugoslavia 
should be at the centre of the Tribunal’s work. The program had to make the Tribunal more 
transparent and its trials and judgements more accessible and more understandable to all 
audiences in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  
To achieve its mandate, the employees of the Outreach section had to communicate 
(from regional offices) in the languages of the region with the peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia. Accordingly, local offices were opened and a strategy was formulated to engage 
the local legal community which could function as “intermediaries” between the ICTY and 
the general public of the region. However, the Outreach program became underfunded 
immediately after its launch. Because of inadequate finances and recruitment difficulties most 
outreach-related activities were outsourced to external NGO’s.  
To implement the Completion Strategy of the ICTY, in 2003 the UN Security Council 
requested the Outreach program to strengthen local judicial systems. Thus, the mandate of the 
Outreach program expanded, if not its funding. In 2004 the program became entirely 
supported by the European Commission. In launching several one-day Bridging the Gap-
conferences the program came closer to its intended purpose: to inform the peoples of the 
former Yugoslavia concerning the work of the ICTY. However, the efforts were relatively 
small.  
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Chapter four, entitled “An assessment of Outreach” describes the local perceptions of 
the ICTY. In 2009 the ICTY was more unpopular than when the Outreach program was 
launched ten years before. Obviously, communication with the region was not in the minds of 
the original founders when ICTY was established, as there were no results to publicize. After 
six years the Tribunal was fully functional and Outreach was launched. But the Outreach 
program did not correct the oversights of the ICTY; it neglected to engage with and focus on 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.  
Too many activities of the program were focused on local judiciaries. Though it 
became clear that this strategy was not successful in changing opinions, the program 
continued its policy. By doing so, the Outreach program forgot the peoples of the region. 
When the program started to assist local judiciaries with the prosecution of domestic war 
crimes trials, the peoples of the region were even further overlooked.  
Reporting of the work of the Outreach program was often inflated. Most of the 
organising and funding came from external NGO’s. Activities reported involved work done 
by non-Outreach departments of ICTY, such as OTP staff who explained their work in the 
ICTY cases. It appears that Outreach focused much of its efforts on building a long and 
inflated resume of activities rather than creating positive impressions, or countering negative 
ones, in the region.  
Recent surveys show that the public perception of the ICTY have deteriorated. The 
ICTY is currently more unpopular than when the Outreach program was launched ten years 
ago. 
Until 1999, the ICTY had forgotten its constituents. From 1999, the Outreach program 
neglected them. Meanwhile, the local leaders that controlled most of the Balkan media both 
brainwashed and incited the public against the ICTY, using nationalist propaganda of hatred, 
fear and revenge.  
The Outreach efforts of the ICTY were unsuccessful. The peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia had not been reached. Instead, the ICTY and the people of the former Yugoslavia 
have a reserved relationship. 
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Annex 1: Tables 
 
Table 1: “Outreach Activities 1999-2009” 
Outreach 
activities 
Visit to the ICTY 
in The Hague 
ICTY reps to the 
region 
Local Outreach 
activities 
Total activities 
1999 2 0 0 2 
2000 4 2 11 17 
2001  11 6 58 75 
2002  14 1 47 62 
2003  19 1 30 50 
2004 10 3 38 51 
2005 14 3 66326 83 
2006  10 2 31 43 
2007 327 15 5 61 81 
2008 328 9 0 18 27 
2009329 8 0 13 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
326
 It should be noted that the local NGO Youth Initiative for Human Rights organised in 2005, 14 activities with 
similar objectives as the local Outreach office that have been inserted into this chart. 
327
 Although Outreach refers to several visits of the Advisory Committee on the Archives (ACA) as an outreach 
activity have I not inserted these visits in the charts. This is because the visits of the ACA served more as a fact-
finding mission in preparation for the decision about the future of the ICTY archives, than as an Outreach 
activity. I believe that these visits would inflate the Outreach-activities figures. For more information about these 
visits, see in the "ICTY Outreach Activities - 2007" the visits of 19-20 December 2007 in Belgrade, Serbia, 17-
18 December, Zagreb, Croatia, 11 December, Skopje, Macedonia, 10 December, Pristina, Kosovo and 22 
November, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, at: http://www.icty.org/sid/10128, viewed 5 June 2009, 17:30.  
328
 As the figures of 2008 are only available as of August it should be noted that the 2008 statistics are not 
complete. See also "ICTY Outreach Activities - 2008", at http://www.icty.org/sid/8938, viewed 9 July 2009, 
10:30.  
329
 It should also be noted that this chart dates to 23 June 2009. Thus the 2009 figures are incomplete. 
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Table 2: “Outreach activities 1999-2009 through the former Yugoslavia” 
Outreach 
activities 
FRY B-H Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Slovenia 
1999 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2000 2 4 10 1 0 0 
2001 33 15 19 4 2 0 
2002 26 14 10 3 3 2 
2003 23 14 5 4 2 1 
2004330 26 10 10 3 0 0 
2005331 43 31 6 1 0 0 
2006  5 28 3 4 0 0 
2007 332 13 32 10 11 8 2 
2008  11 Serbia, 1 
Montenegro 
7 2 3 1 1 
2009 4 6 5 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
330
 The figures of 2004 appear not to be similar because of a conference in January 2004 in Budapest, Hungary 
that outreach organised (the "International conference on facing the past") and the visit of the Canadian 
Ambassador to Croatia, Stephanie Beck, to the ICTY.  
331
 Two Outreach activities not been calculated. One Outreach activity has not been inserted in the chart about 
the communities of the region because it was for all communities of the region, (it was the visit of 2 November 
2005 were  students from all over the former Yugoslavia visited  the ICTY). And the presentation of the ICTY-
Outreach at the Swedish human rights gathering in of 16 November 2005 happened in Stockholm, Sweden. 
332
 The figures of the two charts appear not to correspond identically because in 2007 there were three Outreach 
activities that could not be considered as belonging to one of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. These 
activities were (i) a visit on 19 February 2007 of 24 military officers from Albania, Croatia, Bosnia, FYROM, 
Serbia and Montenegro that paid a visit to the ICTY, (ii) the Serbian Outreach representative visited between 5-
19 April 2007 Michigan and New York in the US, were the representative promoted the ICTY “e-internship”, 
and gave lectures about the ICTY to students of the University of Michigan and New York Law School (iii) and 
the celebration of The Hague as City of Peace between 27 April - 01 May 2007, were the ICTY held a stand at 
the exhibition and staff members were present through the exhibition to answer questions from visitors on the 
Tribunal’s work. 
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Table 3: “ICTY budget and staff” 
Year Staff Budget (in millions $) 
1993  0 0 
1994 101 10.80 
1995 197 25.30 
1996 298 35.43 
1997 386 48.58 
1998 682 64.77 
1999 822 94.10 
2000 1144 95.94 
2001 1211 96.44 
2002 1366 111.58 
2003 1365 111.58 
2004333 1246 135.92  
2005  135.92 
2006  138.24 
2007  138.24 
2008  171.12 
2009 1118 171.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
333
 All figures up to 2004 are from “1994-2004, a UNique decade”. See also "The Cost of Justice", at: 
http://www.icty.org/sid/325, viewed 24 June 2009, 17:30. 
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Table 4: “ICTY referral cases” 
13 referred to national jurisdiction in 8 cases334 
Gojko Janković  
(IT-96-23/2) 
Referral Bench decided on 22 July 2005 to refer the case to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Appeals Chamber affirmed on 15 November 2005 the referral. Janković was 
transferred on 8 December 2005. Judgment sentenced Janković on 16 February 
2007 to 34 years imprisonment. The Appeals Judgment of 19 November 2007 
upheld the sentence. 
Radovan Stanković  
(IT-96-23/2) 
Referral Bench decided on 17 May 2005 to refer the case to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Appeals Chamber of 1 September 2005 affirmed the referral. Stanković was 
transferred on 29 September 2005. Judgement sentenced Stanković on 14 
November 2006 to 16 years imprisonment. Appeals Judgement inceased the 
sentenced on 17 April 2007 to 20 years. 
Savo Todović and  
Mitar Rašević  
(IT-97-25/1) 
Referral Bench decided on 8 July 2005 to refer the case to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Appeals Chamber remitted the case to the Referral Bench pending a decision of 
the Trial Chamber on the operative indictment. On 31 May 2006, the Referral 
Bench Decision re-ordered referral to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Decision on 
Appeal rendered 4 September 2006, confirming referral of the case to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Accused transferred on 3 October 2006. 
Paško Ljubičić  
(IT-00-41) 
Referral Bench decision rendered on 12 April 2006, referring case to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Appeals Chamber decision rendered 4 July 2006, affirming referral 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accused transferred on 22 September 2006. 
Vladimir Kovačević  
(IT-01-42/2) 
Referral Benchdecision rendered on 17 November 2006, referring the case to the 
Republic of Serbia. Appeals Chamber Decision of 28 March 2007 dismissed the 
appeal against the Decision of the Referral Bench entirely. 
Željko Mejakić, Momčilo 
Gruban, Duško Knežević, 
and Dušan Fuštar  
(IT-02-65) 
Referral Bench decision rendered on 20 July 2005, referring case to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Appeals Chamber Decision rendered on 7 April 2006, affirming 
referral of case to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accused transferred on 9 May 2006. 
Rahim Ademi and  
Mirko Norac  
(IT-04-78) 
Referral Bench decision on 14 September 2005 referring case to Croatia. Case files 
transferred on 1 November 2005. On 30 May 2008, the Zagreb County Court 
acquitted Rahim Ademi and convicted Mirko Norac, who was sentenced to 7 
years’ imprisonment. Appeals proceedings are on-going. 
Milorad Trbić  
(IT-05-88/1) 
Referral Bench decision on 27 April 2007 referring case to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Accused transferred on 11 June 2007. 
 
                                                
334
 See “Key figures of ICTY cases” as of 28 May 2009, at http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures, 
viewed 2 June 2009, 16:30. 
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Annex 2: Outreach Activities website 1999-2008 335 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
335
 See “Outreach program MKSJ-a | ICTY Outreach Programme”, at: 
http://www.un.org/icty/bhs/outreach/events.htm, viewed 16 July 2009, 11:45. 
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